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Indiscriminate Attacks and the Past,
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and
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of
the
Rules/Standards
and
Objective/
Subjective Debates in International
Humanitarian Law
Stephen Townley*
ABSTRACT

Civil society, the United Nations, and others are subjecting
the conduct of hostilities to increasing scrutiny. But they often
lack access to internal targeting data and therefore frequently
render legal judgments based on the effects of attacks or
assertions that particular weapons or methods of combat are
inherently unlawful. This Article analyzes the historical
development of key provisions of international humanitarian
law (IHL) within the framework of two perennial legal
debates-that between rules and standards and that between
objective and subjective tests. It argues that while targeting
provisions have generally reflected a balance between those two
dyads, the jurisprudenceof the internationalcriminal tribunals
has made IHL more "standard-like."It further argues, however,
that the contemporary desire for real-time moral and legal
clarity is fueling a yearning for a more objective "rule-like"
approach. This Article then uses the prohibition of
indiscriminate attacks as a case study and offers specific
recommendations for how we might adjust the way we think
about that prohibition to respond to the current legal and
political environment.

The author is Senior Program Manager of the TrialWatch project at the Clooney
Foundation for Justice. He previously served as Deputy Legal Adviser at the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations. This Article is written in the author's personal capacity,
and the views expressed in this Article do not represent those of CFJ or of the United
States government.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The word "indiscriminate"-not "proportionality"'-is the new
touchstone in the public discourse regarding the conduct of hostilities.
In Syria, for instance, a number of states have called for an end to
"indiscriminate bombing."2 The United Nations Secretariat has

1.
Thomas Franck once said, "[iln courts and tribunals, political arenas like
the United Nations Security Council, and popular and scholarly journals, discursive
recourse to the principle of proportionality has become frequent and vehement."
Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionalityof Countermeasures in InternationalLaw, 102
AM. J. INT'L L. 715, 715 (2008).
2.
See, e.g., Philip Hammond, Foreign Sec'y, Foreign Secretary: Video Footage
Exposes Assad's Lies on Barrel Bombs
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likewise frequently stated that indiscriminate attacks are ongoing in
Syria. 3 And on October 8, 2016, the Russian Federation vetoed a
Security Council resolution that would have expressed alarm at
"indiscriminate aerial bombings" in Aleppo. 4 But it is not just Syria:
during a January 2016 open debate in the UN Security Council, of the
seventy-one states that spoke, seventeen referred to indiscriminate
attacks. 5 Likewise, the UN Secretary General recently asserted that
"in war zones all over the world, parties to conflict are . . . routinely
killing civilians in .

.

. indiscriminate attacks, and showing contempt

for human life." 6

(May 20, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-video-footageexposes-assads-lies-on-barrel-bombs [https://perma.cclFFE5-9JLE] (archived Sept. 21,
2017); John Kerry, Sec'y of State, Remarks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov and UN Special Envoy Steffan de Mistura at a Press Availability (Sept. 9,
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/09/261722.htm
2016),
[https://perma.cclV6SL-U22Q] (archived Sept. 21, 2017); John Kirby, Spokesperson,
Secretary Kerry's Calls with UN Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura and
General Coordinator of the High Negotiations Committee Riyad Hijab (Apr. 30, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/7XQG-C2RE]
http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2016/04/256757.htm
(archived Sept. 21, 2017); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Statement by the Small
Group
of
the
Global
Coalition
to
Counter
ISIL
(Apr.
27,
2016),
[https://perma.cclWC3B-CS831
http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2016/04/256624.htm
(archived Sept. 21, 2017). Indeed, a group of states sent a letter to the President of the
UN Security Council asserting that the Syrian regime had used "indiscriminate aerial
weapons" and recalling that the indiscriminate use of weapons is prohibited. See Letter
from the Permanent Representatives of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, to
the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (June 19, 2015).
See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to the Security Council on the
3.
Situation in Syria (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/
2016-09-2 1/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-situation-syria
[https://perma.cc/9BTN-CECN] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) ("We have seen indiscriminate
attacks on civilians and civilian facilities."); U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to the
18,
2015),
Syria
(Dec.
Situation
in
on
the
Security
Council
[https://perma.cc/KNB4-TYRK]
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=9353
(archived Sept. 21, 2017); U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs,
4,
2016),
Syria
(May
Council
on
the
Security
Statement
to
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/USGERC%20Stephen%200Brien%2OSta
tement%20on%2OSyria%2OSecCo%204%2OMay%202016%20CAD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5HSW-V4C6] (archived Sept. 21, 2017). This criticism is not limited to
the Syrian regime. See Statement by the Special Envoy for Syria (Oct. 30, 2016),
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2016-10-30/statement-specialenvoy-syria [https://perma.cclYZF3-BJMX] (archived Sept. 22, 2017).
S.C. Res. 846 (Oct. 8, 2016). Most recently, Human Rights Council
4.
resolution 36/20 condemned "the Syrian authorities' indiscriminate use of heavy
weapons and aerial bombardments." See A/HRC/RES/36/20 (Oct. 9, 2017).
See U.N. SCOR, 72nd Sess., 7606th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.7606 (Jan. 19,
5.
2016). Likewise, recent Security Council resolutions regarding Darfur have referred to
"indiscriminate attacks." See S.C. Res. 2340, 3 (Feb. 8, 2017); S.C. Res. 2265, 2 (Feb. 10,
2016).
See U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at 'Stand Together' Event to Mark
6.
2017),
2017
(Aug.
18,
Humanitarian
Day
World
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/20 17-08- 18/secretary-generals-remarks-

stand-together-event-mark-world
2017).

[https://perma.cc/9AHZ-NAXJ]

(archived

Nov.

8,
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Just as the phrase's usage has increased, so too has the
imprecision of that use. In general, it is now being used to mean one
of two things: attacks with particular weapons (sometimes under a
certain category of circumstances) that are seen as by their nature
particularly problematic; or attacks resulting in numerous civilian
casualties. By these lights, using "dumb bombs," or mortars in a
civilian area, is indiscriminate, and so too is an attack that results in
civilian casualties without a readily discernible military objective.
The black letter prohibition of indiscriminate attacks under
international humanitarian law (IHL)7 is narrower. It comprises
essentially three possibilities: 8 (1) use of a specific means or method
of combat that is inherently indiscriminate either (a) because it
cannot be aimed (for instance, balloon-borne bombs) or (b) because its
effects cannot be controlled (for instance, biological weapons or
poisoning foodstuffs); or (2) an attack that was not aimed (for
instance, an artillery shell blindly fired).?
The black letter view, however, does not permit many conclusive
judgments, and certainly not many swift ones.10 So, for instance, most
weapons and methods of attack are not inherently indiscriminate,
because one could imagine a set of circumstances in which they could
be used lawfully (for instance, against a military barracks in a desert
with no civilians within miles)." Moreover, because the effects of a
particular means or method of combat are often context-dependent, it
is hard to say that one is necessarily unlawful. For instance, while

7.
I use the terms 'international humanitarian law' and the 'law of war'
interchangeably throughout this Article.
8.
I set aside for the moment attacks that are expected to be
disproportionate, i.e., attacks that are expected to cause civilian casualties in excess of
that which could be justified by the military gains, although a disproportionate attack
is also a form of indiscriminate attack, at least under Additional Protocol I. See
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 51(5)(b), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol l].
9.
See id. art. 51(4); 1 INT'L COMMITIEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW Rule 14 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise

Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW]. This
category also includes use of a weapon that is entirely incapable of being aimed under
the prevailing circumstances. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES
UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT' 118 (Cambridge University

Press, 3rd ed. 2010).
10.
See generally GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 526 (2010) ("Charges of indiscriminate

targeting will turn on the attacker's state of mind, given the circumstances and the
facts known to the commander, after a conscientious gathering of such facts as were
available to him at the time.").
11.
Cf. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL §§ 6.7.1-.2 (June 15, 2015) [hereinafter

DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL] ("The test for whether a weapon is inherently
indiscriminate is whether its use necessarily violates the principles of distinction and
proportionality, i.e., whether its use is expected to be illegal in all circumstances ....
Few weapons have been understood to be inherently indiscriminate weapons.").
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fire can rage out of control, incendiary weapons can also be used in a
way in which their effects would be limited. Even "dumb" landmines
could have lawfully limited effects if, for instance, they were marked
and used as a barrier against an approaching enemy.' 2 Likewise,
with some exceptions, it can be very difficult conclusively to
determine where and what an attacker was aiming at (at least
without access to often-classified internal targeting data), making it
difficult to conclude that an attack was entirely unaimed.' 3
This has become unsatisfying to some-and an alternative
account has arisen-because it is an awkward fit with the
contemporary desire for moral and legal clarity in judging attacks in
real time. How, the argument goes, can it not be said that the
devastation in Aleppo and other such places is the result of
indiscriminate attacks, especially with the wealth of information
available about the effects of attacks almost immediately after they
have taken place?
This difference between contemporary discourse and traditional
legal understanding is not unique to the prohibition of indiscriminate
attacks, although the term "indiscriminate" is particularly susceptible
to such dichotomous approaches. 14 Indeed, several years ago, William
Fenrick trenchantly predicted, "We may see one version of the law
developed by military participants, with an in-depth understanding of
relevant facts and relevant technology (i.e., hothouse law) and
another version developed by external reviewers denied access to
such information,"1 5 and his forecast is beginning to come true.16

This is without prejudice to whether greater regulation of landmines is
12.
Policy,
State,
U.S.
Landmine
policy.
Cf.
Dep't
of
wise
https://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/cl1735.htm [https://perma.cc/2DAC-CMKR] (archived
Oct. 25, 2017).
13.
The key question is not what objective effect an attack had, but what the
intention behind the attack was. So, for instance, in the famous United States v. List
case the Nuremberg tribunal acquitted General Rendulic despite scorched earth tactics
because in his position, he could have concluded that circumstances permitted his
actions. 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS

1296-97 (1947-48). This is of course not to say that a good intention inoculates an
attack from criticism; for instance, an attacker could fail to take required, feasible
precautions.
14.
It neither requires that an observer know or acknowledge that an attacker
attacked a military objective (as would be the case with an argument that an attack

was disproportionate), nor that the attacker affirmatively sought to attack civilians.
15.
William J. Fenrick, Riding the Rhino: Attempting to Develop Usable Legal
Standardsfor Combat Activities, 30 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 111, 114 (2007).
This is also not to say that the internal appreciation of the facts is always
16.
superior. Cf. Sarah Knuckey et al., Pentagon Admits Major Investigation Flaw: They
Rarely Talk to Air Strike Witnesses or Victims, JUST SECURITY (June 29, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/42675/pentagon-admits-rarely-talks-air-strike-witnessesvictims/ [https://perma.cc/FU7G-J9UQ] (archived Oct. 25, 2017) (asserting that the
"U.S. government's failure to regularly interview witneses is a critical flaw in their
investigation methodology"). Rather, the point is simply that external actors lack
certain information that those within a government may have.
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This Article seeks to explicate this phenomenon. It offers an
account of the ways in which IHL-and specifically the core targeting
provisions reflected in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions1"-has historically balanced two different legal dyads:
rules versus standards and objective versus subjective tests. The
Article further argues that the jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) began to shift
that balance toward a ."standard-like" approach to IHL. It also
contends, however, that there is now another shift, in favor of an
objective, "rule-like" approach to IHL-or, at least, that the public is
pushing in that direction. This Article then examines the prohibition
of indiscriminate attacks' 8
more closely and argues that
contemporary focus on the term "indiscriminate" reflects this desire
for objective rules.
The Article then pivots to offer specific policy prescriptions with
respect to how to adjust the approach to this specific prohibition in
response to the broader shift in sentiment. The aim is to contribute
both to a salient contemporary debate about the conduct of
hostilities-relevant around the world from South Sudan to Nigeria
to Yemen' 9-and to a broader discussion of the direction in which
IHL may ultimately go.
The Article argues that if policymakers are not better able to
respond to the clarion call for clearer IHL rules-ones that can be
applied without access to the full scope of information that only states
have-there is substantial risk that the goalposts will move in even
more profound ways. For instance, there could be a shift toward
additional norms taking the form of prohibitions of classes of

17.
I do not engage here the question of which targeting provisions of
Additional Protocol I are customary international law, whether for international armed
conflict or non-international armed conflict. For the U.S. view on provisions of
Additional Protocol I that are custom, see Mike Matheson, Additional Protocol I as
Expressions of Customary InternationalLaw, 2 AM. U. J. INTL. L. & POLY. 419, 423-29
(1988).
18.
I focus in particular on a specific form of "indiscriminateness." To
illustrate, consider the follow two scenarios: (1) military forces erroneously strike a
civilian object with precision guided munitions on the basis of faulty information,
which they should have checked more fully; and (2) military forces strike a civilian
object with a "dumb bomb" dropped from high-altitude, but assert after the fact that
they were targeting a military objective some distance from the civilian object actually
struck. There is an element of "indiscriminateness" to both of these scenarios: the
former by virtue of a failure to take adequate precautions, which could be
indiscriminate in a loose sense of reckless with respect to the status of the object to be
attacked; and the latter by virtue of the means or method of combat chosen and
context, which gave rise to substantial risk that the attack simply could not be directed
as (perhaps) intended. These are both significant modern-day problems, but are
conceptually distinct. This Article focuses on the latter.
19.
I assume here, for purposes of argument, the application to contemporary
non-international armed conflicts of customary international law coextensive with
many of the treaty-rules applicable in international armed conflict. Cf. Matheson,
supra note 17.
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weapons, some of which may have wholly appropriate uses, on the
ground that they are inherently indiscriminate. 20 Likewise, an
approach-deeply alarming to many scholars and practitioners-that
looks to the effects of attack to judge them could begin to hold
21
(broader) sway in the mind of the public.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part II explains the
differences between rules and standards and between objective and
subjective tests, and it argues that-despite the lack of attention to
this issue in the scholarship 22 -these hoary legal dyads were well

Cf. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
20.
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056
U.N.T.S. 241; Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357. I take no
position on the desirability of the prohibitions in these two instruments, but only argue
that in the absence of a more reticulated understanding of targeting, we may well see
efforts to adopt similar such instruments. Cf. International Network on Explosive
Weapons, A Commitment to Act: Protecting Civilians from the Use of Explosive
Weapons

in

Populated

Areas,

http://www.inew.org/site/wp-

content/uploads/2015/09/INEW-commitment-to-act-Sep- 15.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZ8TJPRM] (archived Sept. 23, 2017); U.N. Secretary-General, Protection of Civilians in
Armed Conflict, ¶ 7, UN Doc. S/2012/376 (2012); INT'L COMIITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas: Humanitarian,Legal, Technical and Military
Aspects 5 (June 15, 2015) ("Areas for clarification would include the degree of accuracy
of a weapon that is acceptable under the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks in a
given operational situation or more generally.").

This concern was reflected in the reaction to the ICTY Trial Chamber's
21.
judgment in the Prosecutorv. Gotovina case. In Gotovina, which commentators feared
could become "the 'Tadic of targeting law,"' see Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-0690-A, Application and Proposed Amicus Brief, at 12 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia
Jan.
12,
2012),
http://icr.icty.org/LegalRef/CMSDocStore/Public/English/Application/Notlndexable/IT06-90-A/MSC7958R0000353013.pdf [https://perma.cclKD85-8LKT] (archived Sept. 23,
2017), the issue was whether "a commander [could] be found guilty of illegally
targeting civilians or civilian objects based exclusively on a retrospective assessment of
the evidence," and on the basis of an extrinsic metric for assessing whether an attack
was unlawful. Id. at 16. The Trial Chamber had analyzed the effects of artillery
attacks, deeming those impacting further than 200 meters from a lawful objective
unlawful attacks, and inferred a culpable intent due to the fact that 4.5% of attacks
were unlawful under the Trial Chamber's metric. Cf. Laurie R. Blank, Operational Law
Experts Roundtable on the Gotovina Judgment: Military Operations, Battlefield
Reality and the Judgment's Impact on Effective Implementation and Enforcement of
International Humanitarian Law at 6, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1994414 (last visited
Sept. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cclKU6S-7D2U] (archived Sept. 23, 2017); see also id.
("Ultimately, it is impossible to ignore the import of this judgment: it encourages a
determination of criminality based almost exclusively on effects, without any grasp of
what the alleged perpetrator knew or intended at the time of the attack.").
22.
Commentators tend to be relatively conclusory on this point. See, e.g.,
Luke A. Whittemore, Proportionality Decision Making in Targeting: Heuristics,
Cognitive Biases, and the Law, 7 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 577, 586 (2016) ("All of the IHL
targeting principles are susceptible to a great amount of discretion on the part of the
military decision maker."). Amichai Cohen has undertaken the closest examination of
this issue to date. See Amichai Cohen, Rules and Standards in the Application of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 40 ISRAEL L. REV. 1 (2008). Ashley Deeks has also
specifically considered the advantages and disadvantages of a shift from a standard to
a rule in the context of the 'unwilling or unable' doctrine. See Ashley S. Deeks,
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reflected in the development of targeting law. This Part then shows
that, while the advent of the international criminal tribunals (in
particular the ICTY) pushed IHL targeting norms further in the
direction of a standard-like approach, there is now a substantial
movement favoring a rule-like, objective system, and it offers
potential explanations for why there is such a movement. Part III
specifically examines the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks as a
case study. Part IV tentatively suggests a way forward with respect
to that prohibition: namely, to evaluate at least certain categories of
attacks ex ante with regard to their risk of being unlawful, an
approach drawing on the concept of objective recklessness. This Part
both asserts that this may be a constructive way to address the
concerns that have been driving the broader conversation and
defends this suggestion against potential questions. Part V offers a
brief, broader conclusion.

II. THE RULE/STANDARD AND OBJECTIVE/SUBJECTIVE DYADS IN
TARGETING LAW

In general, as Duncan Kennedy has suggested, "rules" are those
norms with greater formal realizability, i.e., those that require a
decision maker "to respond to the presence together of each of a list of
easily distinguishable factual aspects of a situation by intervening in
a determinate way."2 3 By contrast, a "standard refers directly to one
of the substantive objectives of the legal order. Some examples are
good faith, due care, fairness, unconscionability, unjust enrichment,
and reasonableness." 24 Rules also tend to be elaborated ex ante
whereas standards can be applied to facts as-or, more generally,
after-they arise. 25 Like Amichai Cohen,26 this Article uses the terms
"rule-like" and "standard-like," in recognition of the fact that these
legal forms exist along a continuum.
Gabriella Blum has asserted that black letter IHL is a mix of
rules, such as the prohibition of particular weapons, and standards,
such as the prohibition of disproportionate attacks.2 7 This is

'Unwilling or Unable': Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial SelfDefense, 52 VA. J. INTL L. 483, 514-16 (2012).
23.
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-88 (1976).
24.
Id. at 1688. For a useful recent exploration of the differences, see Russell
D. Covey, Rules, Standards,.Sentencing,and the Nature of Law, 104 CAL. L. REV. 447,
456-61 (2016).
25.
See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DuKE L. J. 557, 559 (1992); Covey, supra note 24, at 459-60.
26.
See Cohen, supra note 22, at 4.
27.
Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARv. INT'L L. J. 163,
187 (2011) ("Notwithstanding the many absolute rules in IHL, several IHL obligations
are articulated as standards."); see Duncan B. Hollis, Setting the Stage: Autonomous

2017]
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undoubtedly true. A useful comparison from the earliest days of IHL
might be between the 1899 Hague Declaration on Launching
Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons,2 8 which prohibited a
particular kind of situational bombardment, and the Martens
clause.2 9
But Blum's account is too thin. Certain IHL targeting "rules"
also contain standard-like elements. Thus, for instance, consider the
prohibition of attacks against civilian objects. So far, so good; it does
indeed sound rule-like. But a "civilian object" is defined in
contradistinction to a military objective, which in turn requires, at
least in part, a standard-like inquiry (as a military objective is an
object that by its nature, location, purpose, or use makes an effective
contribution to military action and whose destruction offers a definite
military advantage). 30
Likewise, some standard-like provisions of IHL also have a germ
of rule-likeness. Consider, for instance, the provision that
commanders are to do everything feasible to verify their target.3
"Feasible," of course, is classically standard-like. But as Geoffrey
Corn has put it, "precautions involve a series of concrete steps in a
coherent targeting process that can be applied in a systematic
manner." 32 Likewise, the Joint Staff review of Additional Protocol I
characterized Article 57 as a "checklist," which sounds much more
rule-like as applied than it might appear on its face.3 3 And, indeed,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary to
Additional Protocol I suggests that in case of doubt, those who plan or
decide on attacks must call for additional information, implying that
even if the requirement takes the form of a standard, the process for
compliance may be rather more rule-like. 3 4 Finally, the definition of a
Legal Reasoning in International HumanitarianLaw, 30 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L. J. 1,
11-12 (2016).

28.
Declaration Prohibiting Launching Projectiles and Explosives from
Balloons, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839 (entered into force 1990).
29.
11ague Convention (IV) on Laws and Customs of War on Land, preamble,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. I do not here engage the debate concerning the meaning of
the Martens clause.
30.
See Additional Protocol I, supranote 8, art. 52(2).
31.
See id. art. 57(2)(a)(i).
32.

Geoffrey S. Corn, War, Law, and the Oft Overlooked Value of Process as a

PrecautionaryMeasure, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 419, 424 (2014).
33.

Memorandum

for

the

Secretary

of Defense,

Review

of 1977

Additional
Protocol
to
the
Geneva
Conventions
of
1949
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foilReading-Room/JointStaff/1985_JCSM_15285 ReviewofGCAP

at

First

63,

I.pdf [hereinafter Joint Chiefs Review]; see also Richard C.

"Rich" Gross, Planning and Decision-rmaking:Differences in Processes for Pre-Planned
Targets, Targets of Opportunity and Troops in Contact Situations. National
Perspectives., in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES: THE PRACTICE, THE LAW AND THE FUTURE 55, 57 (Edoardo Greppi & Gian

Luca Beruto eds., 2014) ("very scientific methodology").
34.
INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 1 2195 (Yves Sandoz et
al. eds. 1997) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY]; see also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
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military objective, which is relatively standard-like, also itself has a
rule-like sub-element: that is, military objectives may include those
objects that by their nature are military.3 5
A rule or a standard may also be objective or subjective insofar
as it may turn, for instance, on a person's intent (subjective), or on an
extrinsic way of assessing lawfulness, such as what a reasonable
person might have done under similar circumstances (objective).3 6
Here, again, the story of targeting under IHL is far from simple (even
considering only the substantive norms, and not the question of the
relevant mens rea for a war crimes prosecution, which is set aside for
the moment). Take, for instance, the principle of proportionality. A
number of states made clear at the time of ratification of Additional
Protocol I that the military advantage (against which civilian
casualties were to be weighed) was gained not by a single tactical
attack, but rather by a broader course of conduct.3 7 This presupposes
that the subjective appreciation of an individual attacker cannot be
dispositive. 3 8 Indeed, a number of states have likewise argued that
HUMANITARIAN

LAW, THE MANUAL

ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL

ARMED

CONFLICT 27 (2006) ("Among the most evident of feasible precautions is the review of
intelligence and other forms of information concerning the target and surrounding
area."); Jean-Frangois Qudginer, Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct of
Hostilities, 88 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 793, 798 (2006) ("[W]hile this provision in
no way imposes an obligation of result, it does require that, in case of doubt, additional
information must be obtained before an attack is launched.").
AGNIESZKA JACHEc-NEALE, THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN
35.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TARGETING PRACTICE 54 (2015) ("Either the objects do qualify

&

...
or they do not . . . . Nature is a non-contextual requirement that is incompatible
with a determination dependent on circumstances.").
To give a familiar example from another area of law, constitutional racial
36.
discrimination cases require a showing of discriminatory intent (subjective), see
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), but Title VII claims may proceed upon a
showing of disparate impact (objective), see Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq (1964).
37.
See, e.g., United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of InternationalArmed Conflicts (Protocol 1), INT'L COMMITIEE OF THE RED
https://ihl-databases.icre.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
1997),
(June
8,
CROSS
Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&documentld=A9EO3FOF2EE757CC 12564020
03FB6D2 [https://perma.cclU68S-JMXS] (archived Sept. 23, 2017) ("In the view of the
United Kingdom, the military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to
refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only
from isolated or particular parts of the attack."). Similar reservations were lodged by
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
and Spain. See Ryan Christian Else, Note, Proportionality in the Law of Armed
Conflict: The Proper Unit of Analysis for Military Operations, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J. L.
PUB. POL'Y 195, 204 (2010); see generally Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting in Operational
Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 245,

254 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2010); cf. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court 8(2)(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 ("overall military
advantage").
38.
As the UK delegation put it during the negotiation of Additional Protocol
I, "[s]hould an individual soldier or resistance fighter apply the rule .of proportionality
in accordance with the facts known to him, or should he try to apply it in the light of
facts known to his superiors." See generally Additional Protocol I, supra note 8;
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the related provision requiring suspension of an attack under certain
circumstances can only be applied by those sufficiently high in the
chain of command.3 9 On the other hand, a number of provisions turn
on the "object" of an attack, which can presumably only be
determined by reference to the intention of the specific attacker. 40
And the U.S. Operational Law Handbook explicitly notes that a
number of recent treaties have been subject to understandings
regarding "that person's" assessment of the facts.4 1
The next three subparts show: (1) how these various threads are
woven through the negotiating history of targeting law up through
the adoption of Additional Protocol I; (2) how the ICTY's
jurisprudence shifted the landscape in the direction of a standard-like
approach, while reifying an objective-subjective mix; and (3) how a
contemporary trend (at least outside government) in favor of objective
rules has emerged.
A. An Uncertain Targeting Theology up to and at the Diplomatic
Conference That Adopted Additional Protocol I
Consider first the history of the definition of a military objective.
There was a first effort to develop a list of legitimate targets in
connection with the Hague Convention (IX). 42 The Hague Rules of Air
Warfare of 1923-which were never in effect-also offered a specific
list of lawful targets. 4 3 One proposed amendment to the Hague Rules
even suggested that a certain class of military objectives only be

Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, CDDH/III/SR.8, Vol. 14, p. 65
[hereinafter CDDH].
39.

ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 34,

1

2197; see also Joint Chiefs Review,

supra note 33, at 63.
40.
See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51(2).
41.
INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAw HANDBOOK 12 (2015).

42.
See generally Hague Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval
Forces in Time of War art. 2, Jan. 26, 1910, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 604; see
also W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 AIR FORCE L. REV. 1, 18 (1990).
43.
Commission of Jurists, Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless
Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare: Hague Rules of Air Warfare, INT'L
COMMITTEE
OF
THE
RED
CROSS
art.
24
(1923),
https://ihl-

databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/275?OpenDocument
[https://perma.cc/E7JH-GWB6]
(archived Sept. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Hague Rules of Air Warfare]. And in fact this list
was criticized for being insufficiently clear. Paul Whitcomb Williams, Legitimate
Targets in Aerial Bombardment, 23 AM. J. INT'L LAW 570, 577 (1929) (criticizing efforts
to distinguish different kinds of factories). Note, however, that the Hague Rules of Air
Warfare required that an object both be on the list and meet more standard-like
criteria (that the destruction of the object would constitute a distinct military
advantage

to

the

belligerent).

IAN

HENDERSON,

THE

CONTEMPORARY

LAW

OF

TARGETING 45 (2009); cf. Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations
Against New Engines of War art. 2 (1938) (defining "belligerent establishment" by a
list).
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deemed susceptible to attack during the day. 44 These all are highly
rule-like. Indeed, in the post-World War I period, the United States
actually rejected (a more standard-like) notion of a "military
objective" in favor of a list of permissible objectives. 4 5 And,
immediately prior to World War II, the United States issued a list of
targets that were "not prohibited." 46
The 1956 Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred
by the Civilian Population in Time of War defined a military objective
as one that is "generally acknowledged" to be of military importance 47
and appended a list of categories of military objectives that the ICRC
believed to be "generally acknowledged" at the time. 48 The ICRC's
commentary explained that:

-

[i]t is generally admitted that a military objective is one which is to the enemy's
advantage to destroy. But this is a point which should not be left to the
attacking side alone to judge. If it were, the outcome would be to justify any
destruction which the attacking side, in the tense atmosphere of war, might
deem such as to present a military advantage. . . . The vital safeguard lies, it
will be seen, in the word "generally." In other words, the military importance of
the category which includes the objective in question must have been
recognized by the vast majority of countries and that recognition should be
based on jurisprudence or on any other vehicle for the expression of the
sentiments of the international community.49

This is rather rule-like, although in some ways it masquerades as a
standard.5 0
The draft protocol submitted by the ICRC to the Diplomatic
Conference retained the word "recognized" in its proposed definition
of a military objective.5 1 But the definition of a military objective
ultimately adopted by the Diplomatic Conference was more openended. Article 52 of Additional Protocol I provides that military
objectives are "those objects which by their nature, location, purpose
or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose

44.
45.
46.

Williams, supra note 43, at 580.
JACHEC-NEALE, supra note 35, at 20; Parks, supranote 42, at 28.
Parks, supra note 42, at 39.

47.
DRAFT RULES FOR THE LIMITATION OF THE DANGERS INCURRED BY THE
CIVILIAN POPULATION IN TIME OF WAR art. 7(2) (1956) [hereinafter DRAFT RULES].
48.
COMMENTARY, DRAFT RULES FOR THE LIMITATION OF THE DANGERS
INCURRED
BY
THE
CIVILIAN
POPULATION
IN
TIME
OF
WAR
72-73,

https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/RCDraft-rules-limitation.pdf (last visited
Sept. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/SFV6-ZFN7] (archived Sept. 23, 2017).
49.
Id. at 67-68.
50.
It is also rather more objective than the current definition of a military
objective. The exact way the two dyads sketched in this Article relate to each other is
beyond the scope of this Article.
51.
See CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 1, Part III, p. 16. As Ian Henderson has
commented, "[i]f this text had been adopted, then certain targets would have been able
to be considered as deemed to be military objectives." HENDERSON, supra note 43, at
49.
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total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage." 52 This effected a key change: the determination of
whether the objective makes an effective contribution to military
action is one that is made a question of case-by-case assessment (the
word "recognized" being omitted). (Moreover, the second half of the
test, which requires that the objective's destruction or neutralization
offer a military advantage, is explicitly framed as contingent on the
circumstances prevailing at the time, which "made the determination
of military objectives situation-dependent.") 5 3 This then became much
more standard-like.
The same story-initially more rule-like, ultimately more
standard-like-can be told with respect to the proportionality
principle. The ICRC's 1956 Draft Rules provided that when attacking
towns, the attack "must not cause losses or destruction beyond the
immediate surroundings of the objective attacked," 5 4 seeking to
define proportionality geographically rather than by a balancing test.
In the same vein, a proposal by a group of experts at the first session
of the Conference of Government Experts, which paved the way for
the Diplomatic Conference at which Additional Protocol I was
adopted, suggested that
"[i]n particular, in towns and other places with a large civilian population,
which are not in the vicinity of military or naval operations, the attack shall be
conducted with the greatest degree of precision. It must not cause losses or
55
destruction beyond the immediate surroundings of the objectives attacked."

Sweden's efforts to introduce a similar formulation into
Additional Protocol 156 were, however, rejected, in favor . of a

52.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 52(2).

ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 34, IT 2019, 2036; JACHEC-NEALE, supra
53.
note 35, at 31; Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives Under the Current Jus

in Bello, 78 INT'L L. STUD. 139, 144 (2003) ('The process of appraising military
advantage must be made against the background of the circumstances prevailing at the
time, so that the same object may be legitimately attacked in one temporal framework
but not in others.").

54.
DRAFT RULES, supra note 47, art. 9 (1956). In fact, some had suggested
during discussion of the Draft Rules a 300 meter limit. See COMMENTARY, DRAFT
RULES, supra note 48, at 89. Sintilar efforts had been made with the 1923 Air Rules.
See Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note 43, art. 24(4) (discussing "immediate
neighborhood" of operations of land forces); see generally ICRC COMMENTARY, supra
note 34, 1 2185 & n.1 (discussing the Draft Rules and characterizing them as evincing
an effort at "precision").
55.
CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED
CONFLICTS, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE 98 (Geneva, 1971).

56.
Compare to Sweden's proposal, CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 3, p. 204.
Norway also supported this approach. Id. Vol. 14, p. 59.
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proportionality provision that is very much a standard.5 7 At the time,
a number of delegations vociferously opposed what became Article
51(5)(b) on the ground that it was too vague.5 8 As any number of
authors have noted, "in bello proportionality is . . . indeterminateineluctably so." 59
Finally, this is also true of Article 56 of Additional Protocol I,
which prohibits attacks against works and installations containing
dangerous forces if such an attack "may cause the release of
dangerous forces."6 0 What was proposed to the Diplomatic Conference
was an absolute prohibition on attacks against a limited set of
objectives. 6 1 The United States along with others suggested that the
determination of whether a work or installation might be attacked
should be made on a case-by-case basis based on the expected
results. 62 And the US approach-making it more standard-likeprevailed. 6 3
But the story is not always one where a rule-like provision
became more standard-like during negotiations. Consider for instance
the prohibition of area bombardment. The ICRC advanced a draft
provision on the subject that prohibited attacking as a single objective
several military objectives which were "at some distance" from each
other. The ICRC felt this was sufficiently clear, 64 but the United
States and others disagreed. 65 During negotiations, Australia as well
as Brazil, Canada, Germany, and Nicaragua proposed that an area
containing military objectives separated from each other could not be
attacked as one objective if it were "reasonably possible" to attack
each objective separately. 6 6 (This would have transformed something
rather more rule-like into a standard.) Other delegations, however,

57.
Likewise, with respect to Article 57(2)(a)(iii), some had suggested that
attackers should refrain from attacks "which risk" causing disproportionate damage.
Ultimately, states formulated the provision in terms of attacks "which may be
expected" to cause such damage. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 2209.
58.
See, e.g., CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 14, p. 56 ("To permit attacks against
the civilian population and civilian objects if such attacks had military advantages was
tantamount to making civilian protection dependent on subjective decisions taken by a
single person, namely, the military commander concerned.").
59.
Robert D. Sloane, Puzzles of Proportion and the 'Reasonable Military
Commander': Reflections on the Law, Ethics, and Geopolitics of Proportionality, 6
HARV. NAT'L SEC. L. REV. 299, 302 (2015).
60.
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 56(1).
61.
CDDH, supranote 38,Vol. 14, p. 154.
62.
Id. at 156 and at Vol. 3, p. 225.
63.
Nevertheless, even this was not sufficient to make the U.S. comfortable
with the provision, since it did not contain a balancing test where even great risk could
be offset by the possibility of great military advantage. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL,
supra note 11, at 247-48.
CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 14, p. 36 ("The methods referred to in Article
64.
46, paragraph 3(a) [what became Article 51, paragraph 5(a)] . . . were moreover
sufficiently well known .....
65.
Id. at 67.
66.
CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 3, pp. 201-204.
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objected to this proposal on the basis that "this phrase would tend to
encourage area attacks, because only the attacking forces could
decide whether .

.

. individual targets were too close together." 67 And

so the provision remained more like a rule than a standard and
prohibited attacks treating as a single military objective "clearly
separated and distinct" military objectives in an area with a
concentration of civilians or civilian objects. 6 8
Likewise, consider the question of reprisals. During negotiation
of Additional Protocol I, France suggested that reprisals not be
forbidden, but rather be limited (e.g., only where proportionate). 69
Indeed, during the lead-up to the Diplomatic Conference, as the ICRC
Commentary explains, the ICRC offered a standard-like approach to
reprisals. They "considered that the restrictions on reprisals imposed
by the requirements of humanity in the conduct of hostilities should
be forcefully reaffirmed. In this connection [ICRC] mentioned the
three principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and humanity."7 0
Ultimately, however, the Diplomatic Conference adopted not a
standard, but a specific set of rules prohibiting reprisals against
classes of individuals and objects."
The prohibition of perfidy is a final example. 72 Hague Regulation
23(b) had forbidden killing "treacherously,"7 3 without further
definition. 74 But Article 37(1) of Additional Protocol I provides a
specific list of indicative examples of perfidy (the corollary to
"treachery" in the Protocol).7 5 Thus, the best one can say is that the
negotiation of Additional Protocol I retained a mix of rule-like and
standard-like provisions.
During the negotiation of Additional Protocol I, both objective
and subjective tests were also deployed for different provisions.7 6 For
instance, Article 35 prohibits means and methods of warfare "which
are intended, or may be expected," to cause damage to the

67.
68.
69.

CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 15, p. 330.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51(5)(a).
CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 14, p. 65.

70.

ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 34,

¶

3443.

See Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51(6) (civilians); art. 52(1)
71.
(civilian objects); art. 53(c) (cultural objects and places of worship); art. 54(4) (objects
indispensable to the civilian population); art. 55(2) (natural environment); art. 56(4)
(works and installations containing dangerous forces).

72.
Cf. Hollis, supra note 27, at 12 (characterizing perfidy as a rule and
contrasting it with proportionality, characterized as a standard).
73.
Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
art. 23(b), July 9, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803.
74.

DINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 230.

75.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 37(1).
76.
Just as this Article uses the terms "rule-like" and "standard-like," not all
provisions are neatly classified as objective or subjective. One example, discussed
infra, is provisions turning on the "reasonable commander."
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environment.7 7 The ICRC commentary states, "The Report of the
Rapporteur indicates that . . . [t]he former [phrase "may be expected"]
implies an objective norm concerning that which a State or an
individual considers, or should consider, to cause the effects
described." 78 This is an important point because other targeting
provisions-such as Article 51-speak of "attacks," a term that brings
with it a subjective element ("What were you attacking?").
The history suggests that this was not inadvertent. There was no
measure like Article 35 in the draft Protocol submitted to the
Diplomatic Conference'by the ICRC (nor was there anything akin to
what became the environmental provisions of Article 55).79 Hungary,
East Germany, and Czechoslovakia originally proposed that it be
forbidden to destroy or impair the natural environment.80 Australia
made a similar proposal, although the Australian proposal appeared
to contemplate a different threshold (using the word "despoil").8 1 The
words originally proposed, such as "destroy," "impair," or "despoil,"
are much more consequential than "attack," turning, at least
somewhat, on what is expected ultimately to transpire rather than on
82
the intent at the time the decision is taken to use force.
The same is true of Article 51(2), concerning attacks with the
primary purpose of spreading terror. During the Diplomatic
Conference a number of delegations rejected proposals that would
have turned on the "intent" of the attacker.8 3 Rather, negotiators
adopted a test turning on the "primary purpose" of the act. Again,

Id. at art. 35 (emphasis added); cf. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 34, T
77.
123-126.
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 1458, 419 n.127 (emphasis added).
78.
This is also consistent with the discussion in a Working Group at the diplomatic
conference, during which it was clear that the desire was to cover not only deliberate
harm directed against the environment, but also what the state or individual "ought to
realize," objectively, would cause such harm. CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 15, p. 360.
79.
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 34, T 2129 ("The ICRC draft did not
contain provisions aimed at safeguarding the environment specifically.").
CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 3, p. 221.
80.
CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 3, p. 220.
81.
82.
The ICTY has made clear that an "attack" is a "course of conduct" rather,
than the result thereof. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No IT-97-25-T,
Judgment ¶ 184 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002).
CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 14, p. 56 (Egypt); id. at 62 (Mauritania) ("the
83.
concept of intention and the principle of proportionality should be replaced by more
objective terms"); id. at 66 (Netherlands) ("rules laid down in paragraph 3 should be
made more precise and should contain more objective criteria"); id. at 68 (India) ("It
seemed unnecessary to look into the intention of a party to a conflict in case of attack
when providing protection to the civilian population, or to think in terms of criminal
law."); cf. id. at 60 (Sweden) ("With regard to paragraph 1, his delegation agreed with
the view that intent was difficult to prove. On the other hand, the alternative
suggested by the delegation of the Soviet Union, namely, 'acts capable of spreading
terror', covered a very broad category indeed.' Perhaps the Working Group could find a
compromised [sic] solutions such as, for example, 'acts likely to spread terror."'). But see
id. at 63 (Australia) (suggesting it would ultimately all be up to commanders); id. at 65
(France) (suggesting that attacks inevitably spread terror among civilian populations).
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here there is rejection of subjectivity in favor of objectivity. Finally,
the same is true of the prohibition of weapons that are "of a nature"
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 84 As Yoram
Dinstein has said, "By pointing at the 'nature' of the weapon, the
accent in Additional Protocol I .

.

. is placed on the objective character

of the armament."8 5
On the other hand, a significant number of provisions turn on
the specific, subjective approach of the commander.8 6 Take, for
instance, the rule prohibiting attacks on objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population for the specific purpose of denying
them for their sustenance value to the civilian population.8 7 In
elaborating the San Remo Manual on Naval Warfare, some experts
criticized this, arguing that "it has never been possible to prohibit
methods of warfare which rely on a factual establishment of the
subjective purpose of belligerents."8 8 Nevertheless, a corollary
provision on blockade was included in the Manual. 89
Perhaps most tellingly, in discussing the "reasonable
commander" test for proportionality, discussed in greater detail infra,
the ICRC Commentary recognized that this was at least in part
ultimately a subjective standard.9 0 Indeed, as the ICTY put it in their

84.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 35(2).

85.

DINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 64.

86.
Indeed, under instruments that laid the groundwork for Additional
Protocol I, and in the context of negotiation of the Protocol, the lawfulness of an attack
was keyed to the intent of the attacker. See DRAFT RULES, supra note 47, art. 8(a), (b)
("The person responsible for ordering or launching an attack shall . . . make sure that
the objective, or objectives, to be attacked are military objectives . . . . [and] take into
account the loss and destruction which the attack . . . is liable to inflict upon the
civilian population."); INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONFERENCE OF
GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAw APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, BASIC TEXTS 18 (1972) ("Those
who order or launch an attack . . . ...); INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, PROTECTION OF
THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AGAINST DANGERS OF HOSTILITIES 83-84 (1971) (discussing

"[tihose who order or launch an attack .
"...
). More obliquely, but to similar effect, an
early ICRC proposal focused on the rule that civilians should be protected against
"attacks mounted directly against [them]." INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, PROTECTION OF
THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AGAINST DANGERS OF HOSTILITIES 38 (1971) (emphasis

added). The question of whether an attack is direct or indirect requires analysis of the
attacker's intent.
87.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 54(2) (emphasis added).
88.

SAN REMO MANUAL

ON INTERNATIONAL

LAw APPLICABLE TO ARMED

CONFLICTS AT SEA 102 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO
MANUAL].

Id. at 179.
89.
ICRC Commentary, supra note 34, ¶ 2208 ("[T]his system is based to some
90.
extent on a subjective evaluation."). That said, the ICRC Commentary suggests that
damage may never be "extensive," ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 1980,
appearing to re-insert an objective component. Commentators have rejected this. See
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report on NATO's bombing in Kosovo, "Commanders with different
doctrinal backgrounds and differing degrees of combat experience or
national military histories would not always agree." 9 ' And, of course,
the principle of proportionality is "forward looking, not retrospective,"
i.e., turning on the attacker's expectations at the time of attack. 92
Finally, this same emphasis on the subjective is also manifested
at a more general level in the desire for the commander to be afforded
a margin of appreciation. For instance, a number of states expressed
their understanding that the presumption of civilian status should
not, if there were a small doubt, preclude a commander from
attacking.93 And as reflected in the debate surrounding the San Remo
Manual, many states and scholars understood the feasible
precautions rule as turning on "the information available to [the
attacker]

."9

B. The Turn to InternationalCriminalLaw
Amichai Cohen has asserted that a move is taking place from
more "rule-like" JHL to more "standard-like" IHL. 9 5 He asserts that
this is the result of courts increasingly scrutinizing the conduct of
hostilities. This Article suggests that a further reason for this shift is
courts' need to extrapolate from more detailed provisions governing
international armed conflict to non-international armed conflict,
which has scant applicable treaty law.96 All of this is unsurprising
given that courts tend to apply the law ex post, and that fits most
comfortably with a standard-like approach.
A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 18 (1996); cf. Statement of Interest of the
United States at 41, Matar v. Dichter, No. 05 Civ. 10270, (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2006) ('In
short, questions of proportionality are highly open-ended, and the answers to them
tend to be subjective.") (emphasis added).
91.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: FINAL
REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA T 50 (June 8, 2000) [hereinafter

NATO REPORT]; see also Isabel Robinson & Ellen Nohle, Proportionality and
Precautions in Attack: The Reverberating Effect of Using Explosive Weapons in
Populated Areas, 98(1) INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 107, 119-20 (2016) (describing
arguments both that it is a subjective standard and an objective standard).
92.

Eric T. Jensen, Targeting of Persons and Property,,inTHE WAR ON TERROR

AND THE LAWS OF WAR 54 (Michael Lewis ed., 2009); ROGERS, supra note 90, at 21-22.
93.
Schmitt, supra note 37, at 249 (citing UK statement).
94.
SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 88, at 123 (noting that such a provision in
the San Remo Manual was to "correct one of the deficiencies of the text of API which
also attracted statements of understanding").
95.
Cohen, supra note 22, at 15-16 ("IHL by itself and its application have
become more standard-like.").
96.
Cf. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on The Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, TT 126-27 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (application of IAC provisions "has not
taken place in the form of a full and mechanical transplant of those rules to internal
conflicts; rather, the general essence of those rules, and not the detailed regulation
they may contain, has become applicable to internal conflicts.").
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Indeed, before the creation of the ICTY, the general approach to
accountability had been for the commander to investigate and
discipline his or her own troops 97 or for domestic courts to address the
issue. The ICTY, however, has done things such as bring the
"reasonable
commander"
standard
for
proportionality
to
prominence. 9 8 Analogous to the "reasonable person" in domestic
criminal law, the reasonable commander is "the reasonable man in
the law of war [and] is based upon the experience of military men in
dealing with basic military problems."9 9 Reasonableness is the
quintessential
standard.oo
As Thomas
Franck has said,
proportionality lends itself to second opinions.0lo
Nor is the "reasonable commander" a construct limited to
proportionality. He or she is also deployed to assess judgments
regarding whether an objective constitutes a belligerent or military
objective.o 2 As the ICTY has stated, "The Prosecution must show that

97.
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 34, 1 3562 ("act like an investigating
magistrate"); see Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 87(3).
98.
Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment and
Opinion ¶ 58 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) ("In
determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine whether a
reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator,
making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have expected

excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack."); NATO REPORT, supra note 91,
¶ 50 ("It is suggested that the determination of relative values must be that of the
'reasonable military commander.' Although there will be room for argument in close
cases, there will be many cases where reasonable military commanders will agree that

the injury to noncombatants or the damage to civilian objects was clearly
disproportionate to the military advantage gained."); see also Michael Bothe, The
Protectionof the Civilian Populationand NATO Bombing on Yugoslavia: Comments on
a Report to the Prosecutorof the ICTY, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 531, 535 (2011) ("The report
suggests that the decisive yardstick should be the judgment of the 'reasonable military
commander.' But this is not really a satisfactory solution, at least not unless the
reasonable military commander is defined in more civilian terms."); cf. Joshua
Andresen, Challenging the Perplexity over Jus in Bello Proportionality,7 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 19, 25-26 (2014) (citing the German Fuel Tankers Case for a standard of liability
"where the commander ignored any considerations of proportionality and refrained
from acting 'honestly,' 'reasonably,' and 'competently."').
99.
Laurie R. Blank, A New Twist on an Old Story: Lawfare and the Mixing of
Proportionalities,43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 707, 717 (2007).
100.
See Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, Petition for an
Order Nisi and an Interlocutory Order, ¶ 58 (2006) (citations omitted) ("Proportionality
is not a standard of precision. At times there are a number of ways to fulfill its
conditions. A zone of proportionality is created. It is the borders of that zone that the
Court guards. The decision within the borders is the executive branch's decision. That
is its margin of appreciation.").
101.
Franck, supra note 1, at 737 ("In rendering its 'second opinion' as to this
balance, the Tribunal placed itself neither in the position of the actual perpetrator at
the moment of choosing between available options, nor in that of a person with perfect
hindsight, but, rather, in that of an international version of the common law's
reasonable man.").

Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment and
102.
Opinion ¶ 495 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (emphasis
added) ("It is unclear whether manufacturing was still on-going at the time of the
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in the given circumstances a reasonable person could not have
believed that the individual he or she attacked was a combatant."1 03
The ICTY has specifically identified a number of factors-again, very
standard-like-that are relevant to the question of whether an
individual should reasonably have been deemed to have been a
combatant, including:
questions of distance between the victim and the most probable source of fire;
distance between the location where the victim was hit and the confrontation
line; combat activity going on at the time and the location of the incident, as
well as relevant nearby presence of military activities or facilities; appearance
of the victim as to age, gender, clothing; the activity the victim could appear to
be engaged in; visibility of the victim due to weather, unobstructed line of sight
104
or daylight.

Likewise, with respect to acts the primary purpose of which is
alleged to have been to spread terror, the ICTY has suggested
evaluating the "circumstances of the acts or threats, that is . . . their
nature, manner, timing and duration."1 0 5 Finally, in discussing IHL
provisions
regarding
environmental
damage,
the
committee
established by the ICTY Prosecutor to consider NATO activities in
Kosovo said,
In order to fully evaluate [targeting decisions], it would be necessary to know
the extent of the knowledge possessed by NATO as to the nature of Serbian
military-industrial targets (and thus, the likelihood of environmental damage
flowing from their destruction), the extent to which NATO could reasonably
have anticipated such environmental damage (for instance, could NATO have
reasonably expected that toxic chemicals of the sort allegedly released into the
environment by the bombing campaign would be stored alongside that military
target?) and whether NATO could reasonably have resorted to other (and less
environmentally damaging) methods for achieving its military objective of
106
disabling the Serbian military-industrial infrastructure.

While the move to a more standard-like approach is apparent
and unsurprising, the ICTY's approach to the question of whether
tests should be objective or subjective is less clear. This, too, is
unsurprising, since criminal law more generally is a mix of the
objective and the subjective. Recklessness and criminal negligence,

incident but in any case it is not reasonable to consider that the employees of such a
manufacturing plant would be considered legitimate targets.").
103.
Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment and
Opinion ¶ 55 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (emphasis
added); see generally Prosecutor v. Naser Oric, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, June 30, 2006).
104.
Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment and
Opinion ¶ 188 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
105.
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, ¶ 104 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006).
106.
NATO REPORT, supra note 91, ¶ 24 (emphasis added).
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for instance, turn on the facts known to the actor. 107 While the "facts
known to the actor" has its origins in a desire for an objective test for
criminal liability,10 8 it is necessarily at least somewhat subjective.10 9
In this vein, in the context of determining whether an object
constituted a military objective, the ICTY has looked to what the
commander knew.1 10 And again, although there is a reasonableness
overlay, there is a difference between the "reasonable commander"
and the "reasonable person" that makes the former a more subjective
entity. That is, the latter individual is generally constructed on the
basis of what "the great mass of mankind would have done" or cost
efficiency,111 but the "reasonable commander" is someone who is
supposed to know a great many more things, factual and legal, 112
than does the reasonable person," 3 and thus an element of
subjectivity is introduced. 114

107.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (AM. LAW. INST. 1962) (discussing

"the circumstances known to [the actor]").

108.
See Eric A. Johnson, Knowledge, Risk, and Wrongdoing: The Model Penal
Code's Forgotten Answer to the Riddle of Objective Probability, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 507,
517-18 (2011).
109.
See Janina Dill, The Definition of a Legitimate Target of Attack: Not More
than a Moral Plea?, 103 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 229, 231-32 (2009) ("Even a military
commander deciding in good faith has to rely on personal judgment to establish what
he or she considers a proportionate anticipated loss of human life in relation to the
expected military advantage."). The most useful analogy may be to the Fourth
Amendment, pursuant to which courts will look to the information (subjectively) known
by an officer and measure it against an (objective) standard such as probable cause. See

Johnson, supra note 108, at 534-35 ("[T]he probabilities at issue are 'objective' ... [and]
are derived objectively from a body of facts defined by what the actor knows."); cf.
Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment and a Proposed Quantum of
Information Component, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 437, 478 (2012).
110.
See Prosecutor v. Prlic, Case No. IT-04-74, Judgment, ¶ 1354 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 29, 2003) ("mhe HVO command was aware that
the ABiH was using the bridge for this purpose."); id. ¶ 1357 ("In light of the its [sic]
previous considerations, the Chamber considers that the HVO armed forces were

aware that the ABiH was using the Old Bridge for military purposes and that its
destruction was a strategic advantage because it completely isolated the Muslim
enclave on the right bank and prevented the ABiH from supplying the front line.").
111.
Allen D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
323, 325-26 (2012).
112.
See Reasonable Military Commanders and Reasonable Civilians, in LEGAL
AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO's Kosovo CAMPAIGN, 78 INT'L L. STUD. at 211, 212

(Andru Wall ed., 2002) ("What was the thought of a reasonable man? A reasonable man
is the man on a downtown bus; that is not the reasonable soldier. One of the reasons
that I don't like civilian judges trying military offenses is that they don't know the
circumstances that were prevailing at the time that led to the soldier's actions. The
question of what is reasonable in times of conflict depends on what is reasonable in the
eyes of the man who is involved in that conflict.").
113.
See NATO REPORT, supra note 91, ¶ 50 ("It is unlikely that a human
rights lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign the same relative
values to military advantage and to injury to noncombatants.").
114.
Cf. Ann C. McGinley, Reasonable Men?, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2012)
(describing the use of "reasonable person" and "reasonable woman" standards in Title

VII sexual harassment lawsuits).
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This trend line-toward a standard-like approach-is by no
means entirely consistent, especially in the non-judicial space. The
San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed
Conflicts at Sea, adopted in 1994, for instance, is rather more rulelike than Additional Protocol I. But this analysis suggests that there
has been such a trend line.
C. Contemporary Trends
If IHL targeting provisions have historically included both rulelike and standard-like elements, and if the ICTY's application of
those aspects of IHL was often standard-like, the contemporary winds
are blowing in the opposite direction. This Part makes the case that a
preference is emerging-at least in some quarters-for a rule-like
approach to targeting.
To give one example, what might in years past have been
considered disarmament issues are increasingly being asserted as
IHL. Disarmament has tended to be a rule-based system insofar as it
has generally prohibited or specifically regulated particular weapons.
Historically, however, disarmament and IHL were distinct.11 5 Indeed,
at the time of negotiation of Additional Protocol I, in expressing a
negative view of a proposal to have a committee review the legality of
weapons, the United States said that "[i]t was difficult for any
reasonable Government to place restrictions on weapons on the
ground of their illegality: any agreement on prohibition or restriction
of use of such weapons had to be based on decisions taken for
humanitarian reasons alone."11 6 Likewise, a group of experts at the

The ICRC, for instance, said at the time of the negotiation of Additional
115.
weapons, in themselves, falls principally within the
Protocol I, "the prohibition of ...
competence of the United Nations [and its work on disarmament]. It is proper for the
Red Cross . . . to consider weapons more from the point of view of their employment."
CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 55,
at 20; see also CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED
CONFLICTS, I, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE 127 (Second Session, Geneva,

1972) ("[A] representative of the ICRC stated the basic reasons which had led the ICRC
to limit Article 30 to general principles, without including specific prohibitions of
particular weapons.") [hereinafter REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE]. Where

the ICRC did see a role for itself was in seeking to ensure that weapons had features
that permitted them to be controlled (as that permitted them potentially to be used in
compliance with IHL). See COMMENTARY, DRAFT RULES, supra note 48, at 12 (arguing
escape . . . from the control of those who
for prohibition on weapons that "could ...
employ them."); REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE 152 (proposal of group of
experts on safety devices); see generally FRlTS KALSHOVEN, ARMS, ARMAMENTS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 228-29 (1986).

CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 7, p. 21. Likewise, it was clear to the
116.
proponents of the proposal that it would have drawn a link between IHL and
prohibitions and restrictions on particular weapons. See id. at 47 ("The Romanian
delegation fully appreciates the principles that motivated the sponsors of this proposal,
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first session of the Conference of Government Experts suggested that
napalm be prohibited where it might affect the civilian population
and delayed-action weapons (such as mines) be prohibited where they
would be likely to cause suffering,11 7 but these questions were
ultimately deferred to a disarmament process separate from the
negotiation of the Protocols, at which even more intricately defined
rules were considered.1 18
Yet in the negotiation of what could have been a Protocol VI to
the Convention on Conventional Weapons regarding cluster
munitions, drawing a link between IHL and disarmament was much
more widely accepted, and a significant number of states took the
view that the prohibition of cluster munitions contained in the Oslo
Convention 1 9 reflected a rule of JHL (as opposed to a restraint that
went beyond what IHL required). On this basis, a number of states
resisted the possibility of a Protocol VI to the CCW (which would have
regulated but not banned cluster munitions) because they saw it as
"legitimizing" the use of cluster munitions under IHL.1 20
Nor are cluster munitions the only example. Consider, for
instance, the international response to the Assad regime's use of
whose main aim is to establish a precise legal link between international humanitarian
law applicable in armed conflicts and the prohibition or restriction of the use of certain
conventional weapons."); id. at 38 (Austria) (supporting a requirement that "a link
should be established between international humanitarian law and any instruments
that might be adopted in the future on the prohibition or restriction of the use of
certain particularly cruel weapons.").
117.

REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE, supra note 115, at 107; see

also CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 4, p. 232-33 (Swedish proposal on behalf of a group of
delegations to prohibit incendiaries unless intended for use against specified targets).
118.

See CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 34 (Lucerne, 1974) (proposing a prohibition on the use of
incendiary weapons in populated areas); CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON
THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONTIONAL WEAPONS (SECOND SESSION) 181-82

(Lugano, 1976) (suggesting forbidding incendiaries except when directed at the
following targets or for the following purposes: close combat support, bunkers, military
airfields, armor, in repelling seaborne attacks); see also REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE
CONFERENCE, supra note 115, at 107 (suggesting additional possible targets). The
eventual result was Protocol III to the CCW, which prohibits the use of air-delivered
incendiary weapons against military objectives located within a concentration of
civilians; it likewise forbids such attacks unless the military objectives are clearly
separated from the concentration of civilians in cases of non-air-delivered incendiaries.
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, arts. 2(2)(3), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171.
119.
See generally Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 48 I.L.M.
357.
120.
Statement of Costa Rica, CCW Fourth Review Conference, 24 November
2011,
at
1,
http://www.unog.chl80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/803027DB1CD6D1EDC125796B
[https://perma.cc/9FAZ-FBYJ]
003C9CBB/$file/MCIICostaRicaGroupStmnt.pdf
(archived Sept. 21, 2017); Statement of ICRC, CCW Fourth Review Conference, 15
3,
2011,
at
November
http://www.unog.chl80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C3DE092D8814FO7BC12579650
05CO58B/$file/4thRevConICRC.pdf [https://perma.ccl45A6-E8HC] (archived Sept. 21,
2017).

1246

VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 50:1223

chemical weapons. At the time the regime used chemical weapons,
Syria was not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. 121 Yet
President Obama said on September 10, 2013 that chemical weapons
use was a violation of the laws of war. 122 That is, the United States
staked out the position that the ban on chemical weapons was not
simply a feature of disarmament policy and treaty law, but also
derived from IHL.
A final illustrative example is the debate surrounding Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Autonomous weapons would
clearly not be unlawful in all circumstances as a matter of IHL. For
instance, imagine if they were used undersea, against an isolated
tank formation, or in the case of machine-on-machine warfare. 123 The
risk of systemic targeting errors would be substantially reduced and
it would be hard to argue that they were necessarily indiscriminate in
such circumstances. Nevertheless, some have suggested that because
of the level of risk of use of LAWS, this class of weapons should be
prohibited. This is because, on their account, identifying those to be
held accountable when things go wrong will be very difficult-for
instance, they ask whether a programmer can or should be held
criminally accountablel 24-and, even beyond that, any prosecution
would face other technical difficulties given the need to demonstrate
mens rea (which a commander might have, albeit likely in the form of
recklessness rather than an intent to shoot the wrong target, but a
robot would not). 125 Those who have such concerns move from those

&

121.
See Member States - Syria, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, https://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/member-states/member-states-by-region/
asia/member-state-syria/ [https://perma.cePTN5-HAP3] (archived Oct. 13, 2017)
(indicating entry into force on October 14, 2013).
Press Release, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
122.
Syria (Sept.
10,
2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/
remarks-president-address-nation-syria [https://perma.cc/JAH3-VXNL] (archived Sept.
21, 2017).
123.
See Paul Scharre, Autonomous Weapons and OperationalRisk 4, Center
for
a
New
American
Security
(Feb.
2016),
http://www.cnas.org/sites/
default/files/publications-pdflCNASAutonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XPK-YRAV] (archived Oct. 12, 2017); see also Kenneth Anderson
Matthew C. Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban
Won't Work and How the Laws of War Can 6, HOOVER INSTITUTION (2013).
124.
See John Lewis, Comment, The Case for Regulating Fully Autonomous
Weapons, 124 YALE L. J. 1309, 1312 (2016) (arguing that FAWS cannot comply with
distinction and proportionality, but elsewhere arguing for a regulatory regime); see,
e.g., Food-for-Thought Paper 3 (Lethal Autohomous Weapons Systems Informal
Meeting of Experts), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/
4423082AB7EF30E4C1257F7A00501844/$filefLAWSMXFoodforThoughtFinal.pdf
[https://perma.cclWL38-VFKX] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
125.
See Bonnie Doherty, Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability for Killer
Robots, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/04/09/mindgap/lack-accountability-killer-robots [https://perma.cc/L6UJ-PN5M] (archived Sept. 21,
2017); Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Toward
a 'Compliance-Based'Approachto LAWS 5-6 (Informal Working Paper Submitted by
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concerns to argue that LAWS are "inherently indiscriminate." 126
Again, this is an effort to characterize what in the pastl 27 might have
been understood as a (potential) disarmament rule to something
compelled by IHL.
Likewise, going beyond disarmament, a number of prominent
practitioners have revisited the possibility of a list of military
objectives (rather than the standard-like black letter approach). The
Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations includes
lists of military objectives, as does the HCPR Manual on
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (by way of
illustration).1 28 And Yoram Dinstein has asserted that "[t]he present
writer believes that only a composite definition-combining an
abstract statement with a non-exhaustive catalogue of concrete
illustrations-can effectively avoid vagueness, on the one hand, and
inability to anticipate future scenarios, on the other." 29
There may now also be a trend in favor of an objective approach
to IHL (and away from the objective-subjective mix that has hitherto
characterized targeting law). One good example is recent thinking on
assistance to third states. States are taking a risk-based approach to
the question of whether to provide such assistance. The black letter
rule is that a state is only responsible for the unlawful acts of a third
state if it had knowledge of the relevant unlawful conduct (a more
subjective approach). 3 0 Thus, in the Case Concerning the Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the International Court of Justice found that there was no
state responsibility because Serbia lacked knowledge of the intent of

Switzerland),

http://www.reachingeriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-

fora/ccw/20 16/meeting-experts-laws/documents/Switzerland-compliance.pdf.
[https://perma.cclXB7T-G82T] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
126.
See Doherty, supranote 125.
127.
For instance, when presenting Protocol IV to the CCW to the U.S. Senate,
the Executive characterized the prohibition of blinding lasers as consistent with U.S.
policy. See Message from the President Transmitting Protocols to the 1980 Convention
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Treaty
Doc. 105-1, at 42 (Jan. 7, 1997); cf. Burrus M. Carnahan & Marjorie Robertson, The
Protocolon Blinding Laser Weapons': A New Directionfor InternationalHumanitarian

Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 484, 485 (1996) (noting that "a diversity of legal opinion can be
expected over whether specific weapons violate the unnecessary suffering standard");
id. at 486 (noting U.S. legal opinion that blinding lasers may be lawful); id. at 490
(asserting that one basis for the Protocol was "the possible postwar social costs and
demands they would place on national economies and social services").
128.
PROGRAM
UNIVERSITY, MANUAL

ON HUMANITARIAN
POLICY AND CONFLICT AT HARVARD
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSLE

WARFARE § 23 (2010).
129.
Dinstein, supra note 53, at 142.
130.
See
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
COMMISSION,
DRAFT
ARTICLES
ON
RESPONSIBILITY
OF STATES
FOR INTERNATIONALLY
WRONGFUL ACTS,
WITH
COMMENTARIES art. 16 (2001).
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Bosnian Serb forces.13 1 But the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), for
instance, applies a more objective risk analysis. Under Article 7 of the
ATT, state parties are required to assess the potential that arms to be
exported could be used to commit or facilitate, inter alia, a violation of
IHL.1 32 If there is an "overriding risk" of the negative consequence,
the export shall not proceed. Likewise, the Council of Europe Guide to
the Common Position on Exports of Military Technology and
Equipment provides that exports shall be denied where "there is a
clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported
might be used in the commission of serious violations of international
humanitarian law."' 3 3 And the ICRC has long urged that exports not
be authorized where there is a clear risk that the exported weapons
will be used to commit IHL violations.1 34
Another example is the ICRC's ill-fated effort to "quantify"
unnecessary suffering. The gist of this project was to establish
objective, medical criteria for qualifying weapons as unlawful. 135 As
the ICRC explicitly put it, the project was a reaction to the fact that
"[j]udgements as to whether a specific weapon causes 'superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering' have most often been made primarily
on the basis of subjective influences."'1 36
Other evidence of this trend is the increasing number of
commentators who propose "more objective" tests. For instance,
Geoffrey Corn has argued for a sliding scale (based on context,

See Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention
131.
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICJ Reports 2007, Reports of Judgments,
Advisory Opinions, and Orders, T 421 (Feb. 26).
See Arms Trade Treaty, adopted as G.A. Res. 67/234B, art. 7(1)(b)(i) (Apr.
132.
2, 2013).
USER'S GUIDE TO COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2008/944/CFSP DEFINING
133.
COMMON RULES GOVERNING THE CONTROL OF EXPORTS OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND

http://register.consilium.europa.euldoc/
(2009),
39
at
EQUIPMENT,
srv?1=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=-%20false&f=ST/o209241%202009%20INIT
[hereinafter COE standard] [https://perma.cclMBN9-9HQQ] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
Although the court ultimately dismissed a claim that the UK should not have
transferred weapons to Saudi Arabia, the detailed judicial review of the evidence
confirms the objective nature of the test. See R on the application of Campaign Against
Arms Trade v. Secretary of State, [2017] EWHC 1726 (QB) (July 10, 2017),
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/r-oao-campaign-againstarms-trade-v-ssfit-and-others1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD5X-ZE4S] (archived 25 Oct.,
2017).
134.
APPLYING

INT'L COMMITTEE
INTERNATIONAL

OF THE RED CROSS, ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS:
HUMANITARIAN
LAW
CRITERIA
3
(2007),

https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0916.pdf.
WFFD] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
135.

[https://perma.cc/S7F9-

INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE SiRUS PROJECT 14 (1997)

("They now propose these criteria as a basis for determining which effects of weapons
constitute 'superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering."').
Robin M. Coupland & Peter Herby, Review of the Legality of Weapons: A
136.
New Approach: The SiRUS Project, INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, No. 835 (1999) ("The
ICRC considers that the data provided by the SIrUS Project constitute a tool for
determining which weapons may be deemed abhorrent.").
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including whether the enemy resembles the traditional uniformed
enemy of past international armed conflicts, and modeled on the
Fourth Amendment) for the quantum of information a commander
should have in deciding to launch an attack.' 3 7
D. Rules, Objective Tests, and the Desire for Clarity
This Article contends that the desire for objective rules is driven
by a fundamental shift in the nature of accountability for compliance
with IHL-from courts to the public sphere. While courts continue to
play a critical role, the role of civil society has grown by leaps and
bounds. As one commentator has simply put it, "NGOs have become
much more vigorous critics of ongoing military combat activity." 3 8
Another has said there has been "a remarkable increase in interest,
understanding, and analysis of this law. No state, or even non-state
group, is immune from the increasingly informed critique of its
planning and execution of military operations."1 39
This subpart explains how increasing non-governmental
organization (NGO) and other actor involvement, coupled with a
continuing difficulty in obtaining targeting information from states
and an increasing uncertainty in the law, is driving public sentiment
toward objective rules.
1. Expectations of the International Community
The first premise is that there is increasing pressure to assess
whether or not an attack complied with the principle of distinction or
was proportionate in real time-or at least not to wait until
substantially after the fact. This is much more easily done with a rule
than with a standard, and with an objective approach rather than
with a subjective approach.
This is in part simply one aspect of a salutary trend of greater
civil society involvement on IHL issues.1 40 Consider three
contemporary conflicts: Syria, Yemen, and Israeli actions in Gaza in
2014. These conflicts have produced an incredible wealth of on-theground reporting on the conduct of hostilities. With respect to Syria,
there are near-real-time reports on regime strikes from entities like

137.
See, e.g., Corn, supra note 109, at 479 (suggesting Fourth Amendment
analogies and arguing that "[t]he further attenuated the nominated object of attack
becomes from a uniformed enemy (or his equipment or facilities), the greater the risk
that the decision will result in an erroneous deprivation of life (or property)").
138.
Fenrick, supra note 15, at 112.
139.
Corn, supranote 32, at 419-20.
140.
See generally Brian Rappert et al., The Roles of Civil Society in the
Development Standards Around New Weapons and Other Technologies of Warfare, 94
INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, No. 886 (2012).
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the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and the "white helmets."""
Likewise, with respect to Yemen, Human Rights Watch has analyzed
the targeting of particular attacks1 4 2 and the means (weapons)
used.1 4 3 And with respect to Gaza, there was a stunning amount of
public discussion of the particular precautions Israel took and
whether or not they were sufficient (e.g., "knocking on the roof")1 44 as
well as of the Israeli rules of engagement.1 45
But this is not just about NGOs. The UN Human Rights Council
has increasingly arrogated to itself a role in adjudicating the
lawfulness of the conduct of hostilities. In its early days, some states
resisted the notion that the Human Rights Council had the mandate
to inquire into potential violations of IHL.1 46 But this resistance
appears to have significantly abated. For instance, the Commission of
Inquiry on Syria had as its original mandate to investigate violations
of international human rights law. However, it interpreted its
mandate to include IHL, once the threshold of armed conflict was
reached. 147 Nor did anyone object when the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights understood a mandate to

141.

For recent examples, see the website of the Syrian Observatory. SYRIAN

OBSERVATORY FOR HUM. RTS.,, http://www.syriahr.com/en/.

[https://perma.cclNT54-

HC2R] (archived Sept. 21, 2017). The White Helmets were the subject of a recent
Netflix documentary. See THE WHITE HELMETS (Netflix 2016).
142.
Yemen: Houthi Artillery Kills Dozens in Aden, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 29,
2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/29/yemen-houthi-artillery-kills-dozens-aden
[https://perma.cc/G37U-U8BP] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) ("Pro-Houthi forces have
repeatedly fired mortar shells and rockets indiscriminately into populated areas . . . .").
Yemen: Cluster Munitions Wounding Civilians, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb.
143.
14, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/14/yemen-cluster-munitions-woundingcivilians [https://perma.cc/879F-CWFZ] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
William Booth & Ruth Eglash, Israeli Drones Hunt Hamas as Militants
144.
Fire
Rockets
Deeper
into
Israel,
WASH.
POST
(July
9,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israel-steps-up-offensive-againsthamas/2014/07/09/bb366894-074c-1 1e4-aOdd-f2b22a257353_story.html
[https://perma.cc/4TZ8-5GBX] (archived Sept. 21, 2017); William Saletan, Civilian
http://www.slate.com/articles/
2014),
(July
11,
SLATE
Gaza,
Deaths in
news and politics/frame-game/2014/07/gaza civilian casualties a closer look at the
death-toll israel s-warnings.html [https://perma.cc/38XH-HH47] (archived Sept. 21,
2017).
Cf. Emily Harris, Israeli Soldiers: Lax Rules In Gaza War Led To
145.
Indiscriminate Fire, NPR (May 4, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/
2015/05/04/403110251/israeli-soldiers-lax-rules-in-gaza-war-led-to-indiscriminate-fire
[https://perma.cc/5A8M-G2P4] (archived Sept. 20, 2017).
146.
See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or
Arbitrary Executions, at 7-9, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/20 (Jan. 29, 2007) (rejecting assertion
by the United States that IHL was outside the scope of the Special Rapporteur's
mandate).
147.
Rep. of the Indep. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, at
45-47, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/50 (Aug. 16, 2012).
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investigate "alleged serious violations and abuses of human rights
and related crimes" in Sri Lanka to cover violations of IHL.148
The Security Council also increasingly expresses itself on the
subject. For instance, in a sequence of resolutions on Syria, the
Security Council has "[d]emand[ed] that all parties immediately cease
all attacks against civilians, as well as the indiscriminate
employment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling and
aerial bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs."1 49 And
Security Council-related bodies, such as sanctions panels of experts,
do too. The Yemen panel of experts in particular has devoted
considerable attention to alleged violations of IHL. 5 0
In the United States, too, while courts have generally been
reluctant to second-guess potential future uses of force, 151 and the US
government has argued that this reluctance is indeed appropriate, 152
there are robust academic debates about the possibility of some form
of ex ante review of uses of force. Some have gone so far as to propose
a so-called drone court,15 3 and President Obama signaled during his
administration that the idea at least warranted study. 154 And in
Israel, the Turkel Commission suggested that greater transparency
was needed in the conduct of internal investigations into potential
IHL violations.15 5

148.
See Human Rights Council Res.,25/1, at 4 (March 27, 2014); cf. Rep. of the
OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka, at 5, UN Doc. A/HRC/30/CRP.2 (Sept. 16, 2015)
("[T]he investigation report has attempted to identify the patterns of persistent and
large scale violations of international human rights and humanitarian law that
occurred.") (emphasis added).

149.
S.C. Res. 2139, at 3 (Feb. 22, 2014).
See generally Final Rep. of the Panel of Experts on Yemen Established
150.
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2140, UN Doc. S/2016/73 (Jan. 26, 2016).
151.
See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 80 (D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing
Bivens claim based on "special factors"); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 37
(D.D.C. 2010).
152.

See also Jeh Charles Johnson, National Security Law, Lawyers, and

Lawyering in
the Obama Administration, 31 YALE L. & POLY REV. 141, 148 (2012) ('q agree with
Judge Bates of the federal district court in Washington, who ruled in 2010 that the
judicial branch of government is simply not equipped to become involved in targeting
decisions.").
153.
See Amos N. Guioria & Jeffrey S. Brand, Establishment of a Drone Court:
A Necessary Restraint on Executive Power, THE LEGITIMACY OF DRONES (forthcoming);
cf. Alberto R. Gonzales, Drones: The Power To Kill, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 46-58
(2013).
154.
See Press Release, White House, Remarks of President Barack Obama
(May 23, 2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarkspresident-barack-obama [https://perma.cc/T7PX-BJFQ] (archived Sept. 20, 2017) ("For
example, the establishment of a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action
has the benefit of bringing a third branch of government into the process, but raises
serious constitutional issues about presidential and judicial authority.").
155.
See The Public Comm'n to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010,
ISRAEL'S MECHANISMS FOR EXAMINING AND INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS AND CLAIMS OF
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, at
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Taken together, this amounts to a new level of scrutiny of uses of
force, which in turn feeds a public demand for greater information
and analysis.1 56 This snowballing effect has been compounded by the
fact that the UN-and in particular the Special Rapporteurs on
Arbitrary
Execution
and
Summary,
or
Extrajudicial,
Counterterrorism-have taken up the call for transparency.1

57

It is

also affected by the fact that technology facilitates "near
instantaneous communication around the world of incidents that
raise legal issues."1 58
Second, coupled with this desire for nearer-term assessment of
targeting, despite some limited increases in transparency, the fact
remains that internal targeting information is often unavailable in
real time to outsiders. 15 9 For instance, NATO does not routinely
disclose a full spectrum of targeting data regarding operations in
Afghanistan,16 0 despite increased transparency with respect to
civilian casualties, and the same was true of operations in Libya.161
145-46
(2013),
http://www.turkel-committee.gov.il/files/newDoc3/
[https://perma.cc/ND2U-2DT4]
The%20Turkel%2oReport%20for%20website.pdf
(archived Sept. 20, 2017).
For a good recent example, consider the debate regarding the U.S. strike
156.
of March 16, 2017, which some alleged struck a mosque. The Department of Defense
offered one account while human rights organizations offered another. All of this led
one prominent commentator to suggest that "Secretary James Mattis and the
Department of Defense should now make every effort to get out in front of this issue."
See Ryan Goodman, Making Sense of the Allegations that U.S. Miitary Struck a
Msosque
in
Syria,
JUST
SECURITY
(Apr.
. 21,
2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/40185/making-sense-allegations-u-s-military-struckmosque-syrial [https://perma.cc/7HYN-RT4Z] (archived Oct. 25, 2017).
See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
157.
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, UN Doc.
A/68/389, ¶ 45 (Sept. 18, 2013) ("[T]he principle of transparency should apply to the
preliminary factfinding inquiries required, in any case where there are grounds to
believe that civilians may have been killed or injured. Subject to redactions on grounds
of national security, a full explanation should be made public in each case. In the view
of the Special Rapporteur, this obligation ought to be viewed as an inherent part of the
State's legal obligations of accountability under international humanitarian law and
international human rights law."); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, UN Doc. A/68/382, ¶ 98 (Sept. 13, 2013) ("The
various components of transparency require that the criteria for targeting and the
authority that approves killings be known and that drone operations be placed in
institutions that are able to disclose to the public the methods and findings of their
intelligence, criteria used in selection of targets and precautions incorporated in such
criteria.").
Jensen, supra note 92, Foreward at vii.
158.
See generally id. at 62 ("Much of the information about the targeting
159.
process is available only within the military and is kept secret from the outside
world."). I take no view on how best to strike this balance, recognizing both the
importance of informed public debate and the need to keep military secrets.
160.
Cf. Bill Roggio & Patrick Megahan, ISAF launches 2 raids targeting al
Qaeda-linked
commanders,
THE
LONG
WAR
J.
(Dec.
5,
2012),
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/12/isaflaunches-two-se.php
[https://perma.cc/RE3X-MTGC] (archived Sept. 20, 2017).
161.
See Letter from Peter Olson, NATO Legal Adviser, to Judge Kirsch, Chair,
International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, at 8 (Jan. 23, 2012) ("[s]ome of the
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To give one salient recent example, the United States recently
released a summary of civilian casualties outside areas of active
hostilities from January 2009 through 2015,162 and an Obama
Administration Executive Order requires such reporting on an
ongoing basis;16 3 but the reporting has been criticized as insufficient
to permit a strike-by-strike public analysis.1 64
As this Article has sought to explain, in order to determine
whether an unlawful attack occurred it is not a question of the "body
count," but rather a question that turns (albeit not exclusively) on
what the attacker knew and sought to do.16 5 Yet what outsiders can
generally see are the effects of attacks. And, indeed, NGO reports
generally are predicated upon witness interviews on the ground.' 6 6
While this is powerful and relevant data, it may not be sufficient for
purposes of analyzing the attacker's intent. One of the more
controversial episodes that illuminates this difficulty was the
Goldstone report on Israel's Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2009.167

specific information sought by the Commission cannot be made public. Video footage in
particular is the property of the individual Nations . . . "); see also id. at 5 ("Please note
that it is longstanding NATO policy not to provide information as to which Nation may
have conducted a particular military action. . . ").
162.
See Summary of Information Regarding U.S. Counterterrorism Strikes
Outside
Areas
of
Active
Hostilities,
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%2OReleases/DNI+Release+on+C
T+Strikes+Outside+Areas+of+Active+Hostilities.PDF
[https://perma.cclV9UH-TW6S]
(archived Sept. 20, 2017).
163.
See Exec. Order No. 13732, 81 Fed. Reg. 44,483 (2016).
164.
See Sarah Knuckey, The Good and the Bad in the U.S. Government's
Civilian
Casualties Announcement,
JUST
SECURITY
(July
2,
2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/31785/good-bad-governments-civilian-casualties(archived
Sept.
20,
2017)
[https://perma.cc/HK5J-ZMUZ]
announcement
("Individualized, case-specific information is not provided at all, even in redacted form
to take into account security, intelligence-gathering, and confidentiality concerns. It is
this kind of case specific information that is necessary to answer the many specific
allegations of civilian harm put forward by victims and NGOs.").

165.
See DINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 127; cf. Benjamin Wittes & Yishai
Schwartz, What to Make of the UN's Special Commission Report on Gaza?, LAWFARE
(June 24, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-make-uns-special-commissionreport-gaza [https://perma.cc/RD6Y-4B7B] (archived Sept. 20, 2017) ('"t is impossible
rigorously to analyze whether a given strike or set of strikes complies with IHL without
a detailed investigation of what the operators and commanders in the moment knew
and why they decided to act as they did. It is always tempting to look at large numbers
of dead civilians and assume that the fact of the bodies implicates a targeting decision.
But that's rarely right. Without knowing who the target was, what calculations as to
civilian deaths commanders made, and what the expected military advantage of the
strike was, a rigorous investigation simply can't be done.").
166.
See, e.g., 'Nowhere Safe for Civilians': Airstrikes and Ground Attacks in
Yemen, AMNESTY INT'L (Aug. 2015); Syria: Indiscriminate Attacks Ongoing Despite

"Cessation

of

Hostilities,"

HUM.

RTS.

WATCH

(Apr.

12,

2016),

https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/12/syria-indiscriminate-attacks-ongoing-despite-

cessation-hostilities [https://perma.cc/4WU9-NY7S] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
167.
Another interesting episode identified by one commentator is the EritreaEthiopia Claims Commission's assessment of Ethiopian air strikes on a reservoir,
regarding which she said that there can be "practical problem[s] of establishing the

1254

VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL

50:1223

Two years after publication of the report, Justice Richard Goldstone
wrote in the Washington Post that, had he known at the time of the
report what he knew in 2011, "the Goldstone Report would have been
a different document." 6 8 He went on explicitly to say that "[tihe
allegations of intentionality [in terms of targeting civilians] by Israel
were based on the deaths of and injuries to civilians in situations
where our fact-finding mission had no evidence on which to draw any
other reasonable conclusion." 6 9 Goldstone's statement that his report
would have differed had he to do it over again was based on the fact
that over the several years after its publication, Israel made public
additional information about some of the incidents described in the
report.1 70 Too often, observation of effects leads to a conclusion that
the target was not a military objective (because the result was the
death of civilians) or that an attack was disproportionate (because, as
Yoram Dinstein has put it, "[m]any confuse excessive with.
extensive").171 These difficulties are compounded when it comes to.
proportionality analysis, which requires measuring human life
against a (not wholly objective) assessment of military advantage that
is likely very hard for an outside observer to quantify. 7 2 The result is
that in many cases, witness interviews and examination of the effects
of attack are used to create a presumption of illegality that only
additional transparency-often not forthcoming-might rebut.17 3
information on which the decision to attack is taken." See JACHEC-NEALE, supra note
35, at 71.
168.
See Richard Goldstone, Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and
war crimes, WASH. POST (April 1, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/
[https://perma.cc/8UYB-Z29B]
AFg11lJC-story.html?utmterm=.f791b51a3416
(archived Sept. 21, 2017); see also Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations
Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48, at 404-420 (Sept.
25, 2009)
(concluding that Israel
had
deliberately
targeted
civilians),
http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf
[https://perma.cc/566G-5WBE] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
169.
See Goldstone, supra note 168.
170.
See id. (noting that a subsequent report found that "'Israel has dedicated
significant resources to investigate over 400 allegations of operational misconduct in
Gaza"').
171.

MICHAEL NEWTON & LARRY MAY, PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 164 (2013) (citing Dinstein).
See id. at 23 ("[I]t seems to be rare indeed that such calculations will be
172.
'clear' in the sense that they are beyond controversy, and in a criminal law setting
'beyond a reasonable doubt."').
173.
See Laurie R. Blank, The UN Gaza Report: Heads I Win, Tails You Lose,
LAWFARE (June 29, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.comlun-gaza-report-heads-i-wintails-you-lose [https://perma.cc/ZRJ7-7J35] (archived Sept. 21, 2017). And, indeed, a
Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry on Gaza said the following about its
conclusion that attacks had been directed against civilians: "[i]n many of the cases
examined by the commission, as well as in incidents reported by local and international
organizations, there is little or no information as to how residential buildings, which
are prima facie civilian objects immune from attack, came to be regarded as legitimate
military objectives." See Independent Comm'n of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict,
UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.4, T 215 (June 24, 2015) [hereinafter Gaza CO1].
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Taken together, this increasing scrutiny of the conduct of
hostilities and the outside world's still-limited ability to perform the
requisite analyses in the traditional way is pushing the public
discourse toward changing standards to rules, and the objectivesubjective mix to an objectiv'e one, that is, by trying to identify kinds
of attacks that, even without access to targeting information, but on
the basis of their extrinsically discernable characteristics, can safely
be labelled unlawful.
2. Uncertainty in the Law
The second issue-in some ways the corollary to the first, which
has to do with trying to make external judgments in the face of
factual uncertainty-is that there is uncertainty in the law with
respect to exactly how to determine whether individuals or objects are
or were civilian. This makes case-by-case scrutiny-a feature of
where the
relevant
difficult,
even
standards-increasingly
information is known.
Some question whether membership in an organized armed
group is sufficient 74 to make an individual a lawful target or whether
one has to perform a certain function. Even if membership is
considered sufficient, there are additional questions about how to
determine whether an individual is indeed a member of an organized
armed group. For instance, the United States has taken the view that
the test of whether an individual is a member of an armed group may
be functional, in addition to formal.1 75 (In an international armed
conflict, the test would be predominantly formal, having to do with
whether an individual is a member of the enemy's armed forces.)

See Will I Be Next: U.S. Drones Strikes in Pakistan,AMNESTY INT'L, at 45174.
46 (Oct. 2013) ("Membership in an armed group alone is not a sufficient basis to
individual."),
an
directly
target
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/asa330132013en.pdf
[https://perma.cclH8FX-6P5V] (archived Sept. 21, 2017); Between a Drone and Al
Qaeda: The Civilian Cost of U.S. Targeted Killing in Yemen, HUM. RTS. WATCH, at 84
(Oct. 2013) ("Combatants include members of armed groups who are directly
hostilities."),
in
participating
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/yemenl013_ForUpload.pdf
[https://perma.cc/25WG-8DRG] (archived Sept. 21, 2017); cf. INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE
RED CROSS, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participationin Hostilities

Under International Humanitarian Law, at 33

(May, 2009)

[hereinafter

ICRC

INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE] ("[Miembership must depend on whether the continuous

function assumed by an individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the
group as a whole, namely the conduct of hostilities on behalf of a non-State party to the
conflict. Consequently, under IHL, the decisive criterion for individual membership in
an organized armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous function for the

group involving his or her direct participation in hostilities.").
175.
See generally Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d. 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009)
("But this Court will, by necessity, employ an approach that is more functional than
formal, as there are no settled criteria for determining who is a "part of' an
organization such as al Qaeda.").
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Likewise, there are differences of view regarding whether certain
preparatory activities constitute direct participation in hostilities. 176
Similarly, with respect to military objectives, there is dispute
regarding whether objectives involved in "war sustaining" should be
considered targetable.1 77 One recent example is the targeting of ISIL
oil facilities.' 78 State Department Legal Adviser Brian Egan said,
"[T]he United States has interpreted this definition to include objects
that make an effective contribution to the enemy's war-fighting or
79
war-sustaining capabilities."e
But as one commentator has put it,
"Does the fact that some of the proceeds of a particular industry or
operation contribute to the war effort mean that the operation itself is
a 'military objective' and thus a legitimate target?" 8 0 More generally,
as Eric Jensen stated, there is "increased difficulty in applying the
core principles of targeting to a terrorist conflict."' 8
Finally, there are disputes not only about the principle of
distinction, but also about the application of the principle of
proportionality. For instance, some have sought to argue for a "least
restrictive means" test, that is that capture must be attempted before
killing.' 8 2 Likewise, there are questions about how remote civilian

Compare Michael N. Schmitt & Eric W. Widman, 'On Target': Precision
176.
and Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting, 7 J. OF NAT'L SEC. & POL'Y 379,
388 (2014) ("Additionally, civilians who directly support engagement, like those
providing early warning for an impending ambush or transporting fighters to and from
an attack, are also direct participants"), with ICRC INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE, supra
note 174, at 53 ("[I]ndividual conduct that merely builds up or maintains the capacity
of a party to harm its adversary, or which otherwise only indirectly causes harm, is
excluded from the concept of direct participation in hostilities."), and Schmitt, supra
note 37, at 251.
177.
See Schmitt & Widman, supra note 176, at 394 ("[C]ontroversy surrounds
whether so-called 'war-sustaining' objects are lawful military objectives.").
178.
Marty Lederman, Is it Legal to Target ISIL's Oil Facilities and Cash
27,
2016),
(May
SECURITY
JUST
Stockpiles?,
https://www.justsecurity.org/31281/legality-striking-isils-oil-facilities-cash(archived Sept. 21, 2017);
stockpiles/#more-3 1281 [https://perma.cclBT6A-8SSA]
Kenneth Watkin, Sustaining the War Effort: Targeting Islamic State Oil Facilities,
JUST SECURITY (Oct. 3, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/15890/sustaining-war(archived
[https://perma.ccZA99-55GX]
effort-targeting-islamic-state-oil-facilities/
Sept. 21, 2017). Another recent controversial example has been alleged targeting of
Taliban 'war sustaining' drug facilities.
179.
Brian J. Egan, InternationalLaw, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter ISIL
Campaign, Remarks, 92 INT'L L. STUD. 235, 242 (2016) (emphasis added),
http://stockton.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1668&context=ils
[https://perma.cc/947P-FATX] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
180.
Lederman, supra note 178. For an excellent discussion of this, see Ryan
Goodman, Targeting 'War Sustaining'Objects in Non-InternationalArmed Conflict, 110
AM. J. OF INT'L LAW (forthcoming); see also University Center for International Law
(Geneva), Report, Expert Meeting on 'Targeting Military Objectives' 3-7 (2015),
https://www.scribd.com/document/99787937/REPORT-EXPERT-MEETINGTARGETING-MILITARY-OBJECTIVES [https://perma.cc/C6CA-MFUX] (archived Oct.
12, 2017) (subscription required) [hereinafter Geneva Expert Report].
Jensen, supra note 92, at 37.
181.
Cf. NEWTON & MAY, supranote 171, at 152.
182.
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harm must be before it can be excluded from the proportionality
calculus. For instance, should explosive remnants of war and their
effect on the civilian population be included in the proportionality
analysis? 8 3 Further, questions about the qualification of an object as
a military objective may also raise proportionality complications, such
as how to count other floors of a house if only one floor is used by
belligerents as a command center. 184 And, finally, there may be an
emerging question about whether or not the civilian value of a dualuse object should be counted in the proportionality equation.185
These kinds of uncertainties in the law make the application of a
standard-like approach ever more difficult. If the legal relevance of
particular facts is contested, an argument might go, why not try to
lay down some clear, general parameters that could be applied
objectively; otherwise there may be no way to agree on the legality of
a wide variety of practices.

III. CASE STUDY: INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS

A. IndiscriminateAttacks in the Modern IHL Lexicon
Perhaps the leading edge of the effort to redefine IHL in rulelike, objective ways is the increasing use of the word "indiscriminate."
Consider in particular its use in the context of Syria. The
International Syria Support Group statement of November 14, 2015
"reaffirmed the devastating effects of the use of indiscriminate
weapons on the civilian population," citing Security Council
resolution 2139.186 Except Security Council resolution 2139although
somewhat ambiguous-did
not actually
condemn

183.
See Geneva Expert Report, supra note 180, at 49-50; cf. Responses to
Document CCW/GGE/X/WG.1/WP.2 Entitled IHL and ERW, Dated 8 March 2005,
Response of Sweden, UN Doc. CCW/GGE/XI/WG.1/WP.8 (July 29, 2005) ("Sweden
shares the opinion of the ICRC that it remains to be determined if the long-term effects
of ERW following an attack must be taken into consideration while applying the
principle of proportionality.");

ICRC Q&A on the Issue of Explosive Weapons in

Populated Areas, 98(1) INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 97, 103 (2016) ("[T]he ICRC
considers that those reverberating effects which are foreseeable in the circumstances
must be taken into account.") [hereinafter ICRC Q&A]; Robinson & Nohle, supra note
91, at 109 ("[There is still no consensus on the scope of this obligation [to take account
of reverberating effects] as it applies to the rules on proportionality and precautions in
attack."). But see DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 244 & n.308.
184.
Noam Lubell, Current Challenges with Regard to the Notion of Military
Objective -- Legal and Operational Perspectives, in CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra

note 33, at 79, 84.
185.
See Lederman, supra note 178.
186.
Statement of the International Syria Support Group Vienna, UN
Department
of
Political
Affairs
(14
November
2015),
http://www.un.org/undpalen/Speeches-statements/14112015/syria
[https://perma.cc/3N9Z-MRYC] (archived Nov. 8, 2017).
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"indiscriminate weapons" but rather the indiscriminate employment
of weapons in populated areas.18 7 So which was it that was meant?
Was it that the Assad regime was using weapons that were incapable
of being directed or limited in their effects? Or was it that the regime
was using weapons in an unlawful way, for instance by firing them
without regard to target? Likewise, evincing the same confusion,
when a group of states wrote to the President of the Security Council
in June 2016, they referred both to barrel bombs as "such
indiscriminate aerial weapons," but also to the indiscriminate use of
weapons.1 88 Finally, the Human Rights Council Commission of
Inquiry (COI) has stated that the Assad regime has violated the
prohibition on indiscriminate attacks because it has treated a number
of military objectives located within a concentration of civilians as a
single objective. On this account, the COI is using the word
"indiscriminate" to describe a practice specifically prohibited by
Additional Protocol I.1s9 At the same time, however, the COI has
judged that barrel bombs are inherently indiscriminate-i.e., can
never be used lawfully, regardless of targeting. 19 0 Again, there is
confusion between judgements regarding weapons vel non and
analysis of particular attacks.
The Syria COI really seems to mean to say something along the
following lines: the kinds of attacks the Assad regime is orchestrating
are, under the general set of circumstances in which they are being
conducted, unlawful. So, the COI characterizes the behavior of the
regime as indiscriminate because, "[d]espite their proven ability to
conduct information-led and precise attacks on military objectives,
they have continued to target these areas with imprecise and
unguided ammunition."1 9 1 To put it more precisely, the COI and
others appear to be asserting an objective rule akin to the following:

See S.C. Res. 2139, 1 3 (Feb. 22, 2014) (demanding "that all parties
187.
immediately cease all attacks against civilians, as well as the indiscriminate
employment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling and aerial
bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs").
See Letter from the Permanent Representatives of Belgium, Luxembourg,
188.
and the Netherlands, to the United Nations the President of the Security Council,
supra note 2, at 2.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51(5)(a). Note that this reference
189.
to Additional Protocol I is for illustrative purposes as in a non-international armed
conflict it would not apply by its terms.
190.
Statement by Mr. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Chair of the Indep. Int'l Comm'n
2015),
Republic
(Mar.
Arab
the
Syrian
Inquiry
on
of
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/ColSyria/ColSyrialndiscrimina
teBombardmentl2032015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YJ4-WZU-R] (archived Sept. 21, 2017)
[hereinafter Pinheiro Statement].
191. - Id. at 1. This could also be a violation of their precautions obligations. Cf.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 57(2)(a)(ii). While beyond the scope of this
Article, it may be that a further element of the confusion this Article describes is an
effort to recast precautions violations as indiscriminate attacks.
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"dropping barrel bombs from helicopters over civilian-populated areas
is unlawful."
The Syria COI is not the only entity to appear to wish to use the
word "indiscriminate" to describe the use of particular weapons in
particular kinds of circumstances, without regard to analysis of the
attacker's intention or subjective appreciation of facts. 192 In Yemen,
for instance, the United Nations and civil-society organizations have
suggested that both Houthi and anti-Houthi forces have engaged in
indiscriminate attacks by using heavy explosives in and around
residential areas.1 93 This same sentiment has animated reporting on
Gaza. The Human Rights Council COI has said:

Human Rights Watch, for instance, has labeled certain weapons
192.
"indiscriminate when used in populated areas - such as rockets, heavy artillery, fuelair explosives and, increasingly, improvised barrel bombs." See 'He Didn't Have to Die':
Indiscriminate Attacks by Opposition Groups in Syria, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 22,
2015),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/22/he-didnt-have-die/indiscriminateattacks-opposition-groups-syria [https://perma.cclWC7P-LSCS] (archived Sept. 21,
2017).
193.
' For instance, the UN Security Council's panel of experts on Yemen
concluded that "all parties to the conflict in Yemen have violated the principles of
distinction, proportionality and precaution, including through their use of heavy
explosive weapons in, on and around residential areas and civilian objects, in
contravention of international humanitarian law." See Final Report of the Panel of
Experts on Yemen Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2140 (2014),
UN Doc. S/2016/73, at 36 (Jan. 26, 2016); see also id. at 37 (suggesting unlawful
activity by virtue of "use of Katyusha rockets in and around civilian areas and objects

in Ta'izz"). Amnesty International and other NGOs have made similar points. See, e.g.,
'Nowhere Safe for Civilians,' supra note 166, at 6 ("In the southern region of the
country, Huthi and anti-Huthi armed groups battling for control of Yemen's second and
third largest cities, Aden and Ta'iz, and surrounding areas have routinely launched

attacks into densely populated residential neighbourhoods, using imprecise weapons
which cannot be aimed at specific targets and which should never be used in
residential areas, killing and maiming scores of civilians.") (emphasis added); id. at 10
("Parties must choose appropriate means and methods of attack when military targets
are located within residential areas. This requirement rules out the use of certain types
of weapons and tactics. The use of means of combat that cannot be directed at a specific
military objective - such as using imprecise explosive weapons on targets located in
densely

populated civilian areas

-

may result in indiscriminate

attacks and is

prohibited."); id. at 21 (discussing use of Grad rockets); see also Blind Air Strikes:
Civilian victims of Saudi-led coalition' air strikes in Yemen, MWATANA ORGANIZATION

FOR

HUMAN

RIGHTS,

at

11

(Dec.

2015),

http://www.mwatana.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Blind%20Airstrikes%20Report.pdf

[https://perma.cclPXW3-MU9P] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) ("[I]ts [sic] prohibited to use
methods and means of combat that are difficult to direct at a specific military objective
and that could lead to indiscriminate attacks (such as unguided bombs that are
dropped on targets located in densely populated civilian areas)."). In their most recent
report, the Yemen Panel of Experts again conflated the question of the legality of
weapons per se and their particular use, asserting that "[g]iven that the final impact
locations of the missiles and free-flight rockets cannot be accurately predicted owing to
the inherent inaccuracy of these weapon systems, it is not possible for the users to

adequately distinguish between civilians and military objectives, making them
indiscriminate by nature, which is a violation of international humanitarian law. In
this connection, the Panel considers the use by the Houthi-Saleh alliance of these
weapon systems in attacks on civilian-populatedareas to be a violation of international
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In relation to the use of the GBU-32/MK-82, 10001b bomb or the GBU-31/MK84, 20001b bomb, . . . regardless how precise the bomb is, it remains extremely
questionable whether a weapon with such a wide impact area allows its
operators to adequately distinguish between civilians and civilian objects and
the military objective of the attack, when used in densely populated areas.
Attacks, which used this type of weapon in densely populated, built up areas of
Gaza, are therefore likely to constitute a violation of the prohibition of
indiscriminate attacks.

194

Human Rights Watch has likewise criticized the use of particular
weapons in particular circumstances.19 5 And this is true outside of
these three conflicts, too.

196

The next two subparts explore why the term "indiscriminate" has
become such a touchstone and show that the history of the debate
regarding the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks is consistent with
this Article's broader account of the efforts to shift toward objective
rules.
B. IndiscriminateAttacks and Contemporary Armed Conflict
Attacks are increasingly being characterized as indiscriminate
both because that term suits the kinds of conflicts (non-international,
with force often used in populated areas) and kinds of attacks (often
by air or artillery) that are increasingly prevalent and because it is
conceptually simpler than suggesting that an attack either was
intentionally directed at civilians or was disproportionate. This
subpart further elucidates these reasons.
First, the last few years have seen a proliferation of conflicts
between states and armed non-state actors-beyond the US conflict
against Al Qaeda, which has long been a focus-ranging from the
Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram to the Syrian
humanitarian law." See Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, UN Doc.
S/2017/81, 1 85 (Jan. 31, 2017) (emphasis added).
194.
Gaza COI, supra note 173, ¶ 226; see also id. ¶ 388 ("Mortars are
considered a wide-area weapon which, if used in a built-up, densely populated area, are
likely to strike military objectives and civilians without distinction - particularly given
a scenario in which over 50 per cent of the 120 mm mortar shells fired are likely to fall
between 136 and 300 metres from the intended target. Combined with the impact of
the blast and fragmentation of the shell, this type of weapon is likely to injure or kill
persons several hundred meters from the intended target.").
See Israel:In-Depth Look at Gaza School Attacks, HuM. RTS WATCH (Sept.
195.
11, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/11/israel-depth-look-gaza-school-attacks
[https://perma.cc/354Y-M35A] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) ("The use of high explosive
heavy artillery in a populated residential area, such as around the Jabalya school, is
unlawful due to the weapon's indiscriminate effect. High explosive 155mm artillery
shells have an error radius of 25 meters. In addition, the weapon inflicts blast and
fragmentation damage up to 300 meters from the site of impact.").
196.

See, e.g., 1 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE

CONFLICT IN GEORGIA ¶ 29 (Sept. 2009) ("[D]uring the Georgian offensive on
Tskhinvali cluster munitions on whatever scale and GRAD MLRS were both used,
amounting to indiscriminate attacks by Georgian forces, owing to the uncontrollable
effects of such weaponry and its use in a populated area.").
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regime against various non-state actors and the Saudi-led Coalition
against the Houthis in Yemen, to name a few. These conflicts have
been characterized by the use of air power in civilian-populated areas,
and the result has been significant civilian casualties. And these
conflicts have been heavily scrutinized, with considerable pressure to
evaluate particular attacks. The term "indiscriminate attack" has
been the simplest way to characterize attacks for much the same
reason that courts have generally not prosecuted the crime of
disproportionate attacks. 9 7
Second, the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks straddles the
principles of distinction and proportionality.1 98 But it requires neither
that one assert that an attack was intentionally targeted at civilians
(potentially difficult in the absence of targeting information) nor that
it was disproportionate (a characterization that some disfavor
because it essentially assumes that the attack was directed at a

197.
Cf. Jens David Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept of Intent, 35 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 79, 86-87 (2013).
198.
The principle of proportionality is, at least in Additional Protocol I, treated
as a subset of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. Cf. Additional Protocol I, supra
note 8, at art. 51(5)(b). At the same time, it is not obvious why a disproportionate
attack - an attack directed against a belligerent or military objective but with
unacceptable collateral damage - would fall under the strict terms of Article 51(4).
(Indeed, the ICRC treats the rules prohibiting indiscriminate and disproportionate
attacks as distinct in their customary international law study.) The International
Court of Justice, on the other hand, has suggested that the prohibition of
indiscriminate attacks flows from the principle of distinction. Cf. Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Reports, 226, 257 (Jul. 8)
("States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never
use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military
targets.") (emphasis added). Such a view has a certain appeal, since an attack that is
not directed at a military objective does indeed violate the principle of distinction; but
that approach would not account for the persistent desire, manifested in regulations
that have been adopted to cover the use of particular weapons in particular
circumstances, and reflected in the choice of the word "means of combat," to generalize,
and not only to analyze each attack on its facts. See DINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 68

("[E]xperience shows that some situations are fraught with special danger to civilians.
In order to eliminate or reduce that danger, LOAC may impose restrictions . . . ."); see,
e.g., id. at 128 (discussing conducting bombing raids at night when visibility is
impaired). Moreover, that approach would be hard to square with the desire to
criminalize indiscriminate attacks separate and apart from the criminalization of

attacks against civilians, presumably to account for those cases where it may not be
possible to assert that the commander affirmatively intended to target civilians. Cf.
KNUT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: SOURCES AND COMMENTARY 130-31 (2003)

(discussing under Article 8(2)(b)(i) of the Rome Statute the requirement that the attack
be intentionally directed against civilians). But see id. at 131-32 (suggesting that
Article 8(2)(b)(i) should also be understood as covering attacks not directed at all).
Finally, as William Boothby has trenchantly noted, on its face, the question of
"[w]hether an attack was purposively directed at a civilian . . . is an issue that is
distinct from the discriminating, or otherwise, nature of the attack." WILLIAM H.
BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 65 (2012).
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lawful target but that collateral damage was excessive). It therefore
is conceptually attractive.1 9 9
Third, new means and methods of warfare are being used-and
some that have not been used for many years are reappearing-for
which the term "indiscriminate" appears especially appropriate. In
the case of many of these, that is because the principles of distinction
(in the form of the prohibition of directing attacks against civilians)
and proportionality are unclear or hard to apply.
Consider, for instance, sieges. The Assad regime has used
sieges. 200 And in Yemen, Houthis have besieged the city of Aden. 20 1
While the law of siegeS 202 has evolved considerably since World War
II, sieges remain potentially lawful. 2 03 But how does one think about
a siege of a town that is held by belligerents but that also includes a
large civilian population? One can imagine difficulties in making the
case that the intention of the attacker is to starve the civilian
population, which is the specific act criminalized by the Rome
Statute. 204 What if the attacker claims that despite the devastating
effect on civilians, the objective is in fact the surrender of the
belligerents in the town? Would such a siege be considered
disproportionate even if not "directed against" civilians? There is very
little in the way of law on the question of how to assess the
proportionality of a siege. Moreover, the black letter provisions on
proportionality are ill-suited to assessing sieges. One can imagine a
commander making the case that forcing the opposing party. to
surrender a key town would be a significant military advantage. Nor
does the analogous law of blockade solve this problem. Under
blockade law, when starvation is a result (if not the intent), the
obligation to provide free passage for foodstuffs is triggered.20 5 There

The other emergent area is violations of the obligation to take feasible
199.
precuations.
200.
See for instance the Siege Watch reports published by PAX,
https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications [https://perma.cc/G3JK-7A6E] (archived Sept.
21, 2017).
201.
See Ghaith Abdul Ahad, Life Under Siege: Inside Taiz, the Yemeni City
Being
Slowly
Strangled,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
28,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/28/1ife-under-siege-inside-taiz-yemenhouthi [https://perma.cc/AP2C-Q6B6] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
For a useful analysis of the evolution of siege warfare law, see Matthew C.
202.
Waxman, Siegecraft and Surrender: The Law and Strategy of Cities as Targets, 39 VA.
J. INT'L L. 353 (1999); see also Beth Van Schaack, Siege Warfare and the Starvation of
Civilians as a Weapon of War and War Crime, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 4, 2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/29157/siege-warfare-starvation-civilians-war-crime
[https://perma.cclQ44N-3YS6] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
203.
Michael Schmitt notes that "the prohibition of starvation does not ban
lawful methods of warfare - such as siege warfare . .. that have a military purpose, but
which incidentally cause the civilian population to be deprived .
Schmitt, supra
note 37, at 267.
204.
See Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(xxv).
205.
SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 88, at 180.
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is no comparable provision in Additional Protocol I (or in custom
applicable to non-international armed conflicts - at least not that has
been broadly accepted by states to date). 206 So if there are difficulties
in proving that horrifying sieges constitute the intentional starvation
of civilians (what if for instance they reflected a callous indifference
to civilian suffering?), and if the proportionality calculus might be
difficult, should particular kinds of sieges-e.g., those that affect a
significant civilian population, coupled with obstruction to
humanitarian access- instead be called indiscriminate?
Likewise, consider cyber warfare. As with sieges, target
determination may be a difficult exercise (again, consider how many
networks are likely to be dual-use and the possibility that this might
mean-at the extreme-that almost the entirety of the internet could
be targetable under a classical approach to targeting).2 0 7 Moreover, a
cyber-attack may cause both a range of direct (expected) and indirect
effects.2 08 Some of these indirect effects may be quite attenuated.
Consider, for instance, how difficult it might be to anticipate the
exact consequences 209 of a cyber-attack on a dual-use network2 1 0 that
is classified as a military objective in light of the use to which it is put
by military actors. Moreover, even assuming the consequences of a
cyber-attack were precisely knowable, as with sieges there are
difficulties in applying the standard proportionality equation. Thus,
for instance, some authors have posed the excellent question: "How
should the temporary incapacity of critical systems be evaluated?" 2 11
What kinds of harm rising above the level of mere inconvenience but
below the threshold of bodily injury or death should be counted? With
respect to damage to civilian objects, do disruptions in functionality
count? 212 So, like sieges, certain forms of cyber warfare appear
susceptible to an "indiscriminate" critique.

&

Cf. Additional Protocol I art. 70(1), supra note 8; Dapo Akanda
206.
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Arbitrary Withholding of Consent to HumanitarianRelief
Operations in Armed Conflict, 92 INT'L L. STUD. 483, 489 (2016). Some argue that IHL
requires that consent not be arbitrarily withheld for relief supplies. See generally id. at
489-92.
207.
Cf. Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and PrecautionsAgainst the Effects
of Attacks, 88 TEx. L. REV. 1533, 1542-43 (2010).
208.
See Cordula Droege, Get Off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International
HumanitarianLaw, and Protection of Civilians, 94 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 533,
572-73 (2012); Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Attacks: Proportionalityand Precautionsin
Attacks, 89 INT'L L. STUD. 198, 207 (2013).
209.
See Oona Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817,
851 (2012) ("An ex ante in bello proportionality analysis for a DDOS attack may
therefore carry a much greater degree of uncertainty than would a conventional
attack.").
210.
See Droege, supra note 208, at 539, 541.
211.
Hathaway et al., supra note 209, at 851.
212.
Cf. Jensen, supra note 208, at 207 (arguing that the functionality
approach "seems to be the best application of the proportionality rule to the cyber
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Finally, the increasing pace of technological development has
raised expectations regarding the conduct of hostilities, and those
attacks that do not fit the image of a precise and modern military are
increasingly being characterized as indiscriminate. 213 Indeed, as the
HCPR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile
Warfare commentary notes,
The assessment of what "cannot be directed" [i.e., is indiscriminate] may
change over time with advances in technology. In other words: technological
developments, and the wider availability of systems with increased precision,
may shift general understandings as to when a weapon is incapable of being
directed. In particular, improvements in the accuracy of weapons may heighten
expectations of the general public as to precision.214

This confluence of factors helps to explain why the term
"indiscriminate" is being so often used.
C. The History of the Prohibitionof IndiscriminateAttacks
1. Indiscriminate Attacks Before and During the Negotiation of
Additional Protocol I
This subpart explores the structure and history of the prohibition
of indiscriminate attacks and describes how it fits the narrative this
Article outlines. The prohibition itself (at least on the black letter
account) has elements that are both rule-like and standard-like. It is
rule-like insofar as it precludes the use of particular weapons. It is
of
standard-like insofar as it incorporates the principle
proportionality.
Perhaps more interestingly, the negotiation of this prohibition
clearly reflects the objective-subjective debate. The proposal for a
prohibition on indiscriminate attacks presented by the ICRC to the
second session of the Conference of Government Experts discussed
"[a]ttacks which, by their nature, are launched against civilians and
military objectives indiscriminately." 2 1 5 During the debate in
1 realm"

and

against

including

merely

"effects on

civilians that have

caused

inconvenience").

213.
See Eric Talbot Jensen, Shelling in Urban Area: When Does Imprecision
Become Indiscriminate?, Proceedings of the 16th Bruges Colloquium: Urban Warfare
129, - 136 (2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2883536 [https://perma.cc/7272-S7MZ]
(archived Sept. 21, 2017).
214.
PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAw
APPLICABLE
TO
AIR
AND
MISSLE
WARFARE
64
(2010),

http://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/34198/frontmatter/9781107034198_frontmatter.p
df [https://perma.cclKL9D-QEWL] (archived Oct. 25, 2017).
215.

INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, Conference of Government Experts

on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable
in Armed Conflicts (Second Session), Report on the Work of the Conference, at Art. 45 ¶
3, Vol. 2, Annexes, (1972) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ICRCAnnexes].
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Commission III at the second session, experts acknowledged that this
provision did not focus only on the commander's intent (because of the
phrase "by their nature"). 216 And, indeed, the United States, along
with Belgium, Canada, West Germany, and the United Kingdom,
proposed to reformulate what was then Article 45(3) as "[a]ttacks
which are intentionally launched indiscriminately against civilians
and military objectives shall be prohibited."2 17 The United States also
offered an explanatory statement that "indiscriminate attacks"
should be understood as "those attacks which have no specific military
objective," 218 focusing on the attacker by referring specifically to the
objective of the attack, as opposed to its nature.
In its draft presented to the Diplomatic Conference, ICRC
proposed to forbid "[t]he employment of means of combat, and any
methods which strike or affect indiscriminately the civilian
population and combatants, or civilian objects and military
objectives."2 19 A number of states supported similar formulations. 220
Notably, these formulations also omit reference to the actor or to the
act of attacking and so again suggest the possibility that there could
be categories of attacks that might be deemed indiscriminate
(objectively). On the other hand, Brazil (on behalf of a group of states)
proposed to refer to "attack[ing] an adversary by using means or
methods . . . ."221 And, ultimately, when Article 51 emerged from the
Diplomatic Conference, it referred explicitly to the way in which
attacks were "directed," putting the onus back on the commander,
and, because it referred to "attacks," it was generally understood to
cover means and methods of warfare that might be lawful under
certain circumstances but unlawful in others, leaving those questions
to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.22 2

216.
See INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, Conference of Government
Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Second Session), Report on the Work of the Conference,
at 149 ¶ 3.160, Vol. 1, (1972) ("The criterion of deliberate intention, defining or limiting
the provision, was proposed also for the following paragraph [i.e. paragraph 3] by an
expert who maintained that attacks launched intentionally and indiscriminately
against civilians were forbidden. Another expert, however, maintained the objective
criterion in an amendment . . . .").
217.
ICRC Annexes, supra note 215, at 83, Art. 45 ¶ 2.
Id. (emphasis added).
218.
CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 1, Part IV.
219.
220.
See CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 3, p. 200 (Czechoslovakia, German
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland all supporting similar language to forbid the
use of strikes that affect civilian populations); id. at 201 (Romania) ("strike or affect");
id. at 203 (Australia) ("strike or affect").
221.
CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 3, p. 202.
See KALSHOVEN, supra note 115, at 246-47; CDDH, supra note 38, Vol. 15,
222.
p. 274; id. at Vol. 6, p. 164 (explanation of the vote of the United Kingdom) (the
paragraph "was not intended to mean that there were means of combat the use of
which would constitute an indiscriminate attack in all circumstances . . . . it took
account of the fact that the lawful use of means of combat depended on the
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2. Indiscriminate Attacks at the ICTY
The jurisprudence of the ICTY has made the prohibition of
indiscriminate attacks more standard-like. It has done this by
collapsing the question of whether an attack was indiscriminate into
the questions of whether it was disproportionate and whether it was
directed against civilians. 223
One move has been to determine whether an attack was
discriminate on the basis of a judgment about how far into the
proportionality "gray zone" a course of conduct might have been.
Thus, in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, the Trial Chamber concluded that:
it may happen that single attacks on military objectives causing incidental
damage to civilians, although they may raise doubts as to their lawfulness,
nevertheless do not appear on their face to fall foul [of IHL]. However, in case
of repeated attacks, all or mobt of them falling within the grey area between
indisputable legality and unlawfulness, it might be warranted to conclude that
the cumulative effect of such acts entails that they may not be in keeping with
international law.

224

The idea of a gray area can only compound the already standard-like
nature of the proportionality analysis.
The ICTY has also approached the concept of indiscriminate
attacks from the principle of distinction side. That is, they have said
that indiscriminate attacks may be tantamount to attacks against
civilians.22 5 Ordinarily, one would imagine that this would make the
.application of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks more rule-like,
or at least a mix of rule- and standard-like to the extent that the
questions of whether someone is a civilian and whether something is
a civilian object have standard-like elements. But the ICTY has also
suggested in this context that attacks against civilians require only a
mens rea of recklessness, 226 which pushes the norm back in a
standard-like direction by importing concepts of foreseeability.

circumstances"); id. at 164-65 (Explanation of Vote of Italy); id. at 179 (Canada); id. at
187-88 (Germany).
223.
Cf. Ohlin, supra note 197, at 92-93 (arguing that "[the ICTY] ha[s]
effectively conflated the distinction between intentionally targeting civilians and
unintentionally causing disproportionate damage to civilians.").
224.
Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 526
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000). This position was criticized
by the ICTY panel considering NATO actions in Kosovo. NATO REPORT, supra note 91,
¶ 52.
225.
Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment and
Opinion ¶ 57 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) ("The Trial
Chamber agree[d] with previous Trial Chambers that indiscriminate attacks, that is to
say, attacks which strike civilians or civilian objects and military objectives without
distinction, may qualify as direct attacks against civilians.").
226.
Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment and
Opinion ¶ 54 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (relying
uncritically on the ICRC commentary).
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Finally, the ICTY has also assessed whether an attack was
directed against civilians or indiscriminate by analyzing the risk
posed by the use of particular weapons under the circumstances,
again a standard-like inquiry. 227 For instance, in Prosecutor v.
Martic, the Trial Chamber "conclude[d] that the M-87 Orkan, by
virtue of its characteristics and the firing range in this specific
instance, was incapable of hitting specific targets." 228 While this
bears some superficial similarity to the course this Article proposes
policymakers take, 229 it is fundamentally an ex post, rather than an
ex ante, exercise and the result of a case-by-case analysis, which is
characteristic of a standard-like approach.
The ICTY's standard-like approach is also clear from the way it
has handled impact analysis. This issue arose most prominently in
two cases-Prosecutor v. Stansilav Galic and Prosecutor v. Ante
Gotovina. In Galic, the ICTY considered the shelling of a street and a
neighborhood park that were at some distance from a building
operated by a military unit. The court relied on the fact that the
shells did not land progressively closer to the military installation as
a basis for concluding that the attack was indiscriminate. 230 Likewise,
in considering another shelling incident, the court again relied on the
fact that shells did not fall progressively closer to a putative target in
ruling out that such an asserted potential military objective might
have been the actual target. 231 Again, this approach-relying on a
range of factors regarding the results of an attack from which to try

227.
See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment, ¶ 512 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004) ("The 'baby-bombs' are indeed 'homemade mortars' which are difficult to guide accurately. Since their trajectory is
'irregular' and non-linear, they are likely to hit non-military targets.").
228.
Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-11, Judgment, ¶ 463 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, June 12, 2007).
229.
See infra Part HI.
230.
See Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment
and Opinion TT 344-45 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003)
(identifying the location of the shells as landing various distances from the base, and
that the distance did not becom progressively closer).
231.
See id. TT 382-83 (concluding that the shells landed in almost the same
spot and did not get closer to the alledged target of the attack); see also Prosecutor v.
Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Judgment, T 282 (citing the trial court's
decision that military targets were unoperational or too far away to be considered as
the true objective); PAX, Unacceptable Risk: Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated
Areas Through the Lens of Three Cases Before the ICTY, at 47 (Nov. 2014),
https://www.paxforpeace.nl/media/files/pax-rapport-unacceptable-risk.pdf

[https://perma.cc/QX9Y-LRBV] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) ("Similar to the Gotovina case,
the Trial Chamber [in Galic] used the distance between an alleged military objective
and shell impact locations as an indicator (among others) the unlawfulness of a specific
attack. The distance indicated both the probable target of attack and whether the
attack was directed and its effects limited as required under IHL.").

1268

VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL 50:1223

to reverse engineer the attacker's intent-is only possible ex post and
is not susceptible to ex ante rule-making. 232
In contrast to this case-by-case approach, in Gotovina, the ICTY
Appeals Chamber rejected an effort by the Trial Chamber to
articulate a brighter-line rule (albeit one still to be applied after the
effects of the attack are known)-namely, that artillery attacks that
impacted within two hundred meters of a lawful target were
presumed to have been fired at that target, whereas artillery shells
that fell outside the radius served as evidence of an unlawful
attack. 2 33 Not only did the Appeals Chamber reject the two hundredmeter standard on the merits, but it also noted that it was
implausible to apply it across the board to all attacks, given the range
of differences entailed in the circumstances of each attack.23 4 As one
commentator. has argued, "[A]ccuracy standards must be tailored to
the facts and circumstances of each attack by indirect fire." 235 Indeed,

the Appeals Chamber specifically declined to offer an alternative
standard. As Judge Pocar put it in his dissent, "Does the Majority
consider that the correct legal standard was a 400-metre standard? A
100-metre standard? A 0-metre standard? The Appeal Judgement
provides no answer to this question." 236

232.
I do not engage deeply here the question of how much one can infer based
on the results of an attack. Cf. Gary D. Solis, The Gotovina Acquittal: A Sound
Appellate Course Correction, 215 MIL. L. REV. 78, 97-98 (2013) (arguing that LOAC
"requires proof of intent to attack civilians at the time of attack and rejects an
inference of intent based solely on battle damage, civilian casualties, or other terminal
effects at the impact point").
233.
See Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Decision, ¶
61 (Nov. 16, 2012). In some ways, the Trial Chamber's proposed approach would have
been consonant with the approach taken by the Galic Appeals Chamber. In that case,
noting testimony that the closest military objective to a market that was shelled was
300 meters away, and that artillery crews could reach between 200 and 300 meters of
their intended target on the first shot, the court held, "whether the SRK was aiming for
the market itself or for some other target within the surrounding 300 m, it was aiming
for a target within a civilian area, and this shelling incident was thus an example of
shelling that deliberately targeted civilians." Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No.
IT-98-29-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 335. But Gotovina clearly rejected this approach
(and, at least arguably, Galic deployed its impact analysis in the context of a specific
incident). Cf. id. ¶ 133; Walter B. Huffman, Margin of Error: Potential Pitfalls of the
Ruling in The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, 211 ML. L. REV. 1, 26 & n.112 (2012).
234.
See Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Decision, ¶
60; cf. Gary D. Solis, supra note 232, at 88 (2013) ("[T]he Trial Chamber failed to
explain how a single standard of accuracy could apply to the differing circumstances of
each attack on four different towns by different batteries at different distances.").
235.
Solis, supra note 232, at 95.
236.
Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Fausto Pocar, T 13.
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IV. WAY FORWARD

A. A New Approach to IndiscriminateAttacks
Where does this then leave things with respect to the prohibition
of indiscriminate attacks? Is the ICTY's jurisprudence sufficient to
address the growing desire for clarity? This subpart argues that the
answer is no and offers a different solution. While the ICTY's
approach has permitted prosecution of indiscriminate attacks,
principally by virtue of applying the mens rea of recklessness, which
lowers the bar somewhat, the ICTY's approach is also inapt, 2 37
unsatisfying, and likely unsustainable. Rather, this subpart urges
policymakers to agree that certain categories of attack should be
treated as indiscriminate based on the objective risk they pose. This
approach, the Article suggests, would better enable states to get
ahead of the curve, responding to the desire for more rule-like,
objective tests.
First, the ICTY's approach is risky because it blurs the question
of the mens rea of an attacker with respect to the status of a target 2 38
and the mens rea of an attacker with respect to the choice of means or
methods of combat. That is, this ignores that there may be a
difference between an attacker's understanding of whether the target
he or she is attacking is civilian or military (whether the attacker
knows, or perhaps is reckless with respect to the likelihood that, an
individual who is the object of an attack is a civilian) and an
attacker's understanding of the likelihood of the particular means or
method selected for carrying out the attack actually striking the
desired target. 239 Second, the International Criminal Court (ICC)

237.
See Adil Ahmad Haque, Protecting and Respecting Civilians: Correcting
the Substantive and Structural Defects of the Rome Statute, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 519,
536 (2011) ("[I]ndiscriminate attacks and attacks with civilians as their intended object
are conceptually distinct.").
238.
A number of states have legislation that clearly refers to recklessness with
respect to the status of the target. For instance, under Australian criminal law, a
person may be prosecuted for the war crime of attacking a protected person if they are
reckless as to the status of the individual. 18 U.S.C. § 2441. In non-international armed
conflict, the recent amendments to the War Crimes Act likewise provide for
recklessness with respect to the question of whether a person is a member of an
organized armed group. Id. And in Canada, in R v. Finta, the Canadian Supreme Court
suggested that willful blindness as to the relevant facts would suffice for a war crimes
prosecution. See S.C. Res. 701 (July 31, 1991) ("Alternatively, the mens rea
requirement of both crimes against humanity and war crimes would be met if it were
established that the accused was wilfully blind to the facts or circumstances that would
bring his or her actions within the provisions of these offences.").
239.
Again, this second possibility bears some relation to precautions
questions. For instance, the Inter-American Court for Human Rights concluded that
Colombia had violated its precautions obligations by virtue of the combination of
weapon chosen and method of deployment of the weapon. Case of the Santo Domingo
Massacre v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, and Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 259, T 227 (Nov. 30, 2012). There is also even a third possibility - the
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uses purpose or knowledge, and not recklessness, as the relevant
mens rea, and the Rome Statute's elaboration of war crimes has been
incorporated into the domestic law of a number of states party to the
Rome Statute. 240 Thus, the ICTY's approach may not be sustainable
in the long term insofar as the ICC's jurisprudence will increasingly
frame international expectations. Third and finally, the ICTY's
jurisprudence has generally looked to the effects of an attack in
determining whether an attack was indiscriminate, providing little ex
ante guidance to the warfighter.
If the ICTY's treatment of indiscriminate attacks seems unlikely
to salve concerns that are being expressed, doing nothing also seems
unwise. The current trend lines seem likely to exacerbate differences
of views. Such a divergence may be bad for states. In the past,
differences of view between states and civil society might have
favored states (if they were able to rely on the more permissive, statepreferred approach), but given the contours of public debate today, it
seems more likely that the public will take civil society's side. The
"CNN effect" 241 (that is, the extent to which public perception of
combat is shaped by news coverage) will exert an additional pull,
driving the conversation further in the direction of labeling a range of
attacks "indiscriminate." And the fact that the world is increasingly
moving toward deeming the responsibility for the effects of attack to
rest with the attacker, and not also with defenders who may co-locate
military objectives with population centers,24 2 will only make the
position of warfighters more difficult.
Moreover, there is normative and practical value to clarity, even
if it is more limiting. 243 As Geoffrey Corn has rightly pointed out,
there are dangers inherent in "the lack of a consistent framework for
post hoc critique of the reasonableness of the commander's
question of an attacker's mens rea with respect to whether an attack will strike

civilians - that the ICTY's jurisprudence has raised. Cf. Jens David Ohlin, Was the
(May
1,
2016),
War
Crime?,
OPINIo
JuRIs
Kunduz
Attack
a
(last
http://opiniojuris.org/2016/05/01/was-the-kunduz-hospital-attack-a-war-crime
visited Sept. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/NBX2-CC8P] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
U.S. courts have also interpreted the U.S. war crimes act to distinguish
240.
"intentionally" from "recklessly." See In re Xe Services Alien Tort Litigation, 665
F.Supp.2d 569, 590-91 (E.D. Va. 2009).
As William Boothby has put it, "footage led some to deduce that when
241.
attacks hit something other than military objectives, this must have been deliberate,
and thus the result of a criminal event." BOOTHBY, supra note 198, at 9. I don't engage
here the question of 'effects-based operations,' i.e. operations that are judged on the
effect (including indirect) they will have. But I do note that it is in some ways the
converse of effects based judgments being rendered by human rights and other groups.
242.
At times, the U.S. Department of Defense has suggested that the
responsibility for implementing the principle of distinction should rest primarily with
the party exercising control over the relevant territory. Cf. Burrus M. Carnahan, The
Law of Air Bombardment in the Historical Context, 17 AIR FORCE L. REV. 39, 59 (1975)
(citing statement by the General Counsel of the Department of Defense).
243.
Michael W. Lewis, Battlefield Perspectives on the Laws of War, in THE
WAR ON TERROR, supra note 92, at 209, 221 ("[Slimplicity and clarity are vital. Law is
better served when aircrew are given concrete guidance.").
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decision." 244 Likewise, former ICRC President Jacob Kellenberger has
noted that application of IHL "in practice is sometimes difficult due to
the fact that the provisions are framed in rather abstract terms, thus
leaving room for divergent interpretations." 245
Rather than either the ICTY's approach or the black letter
understanding of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, this
Article suggests that policymakers consider preemptively articulating
a more rule-like, objective understanding of kinds of attack that
should be off limits-that is, determining in advance that certain
methods of warfare are sufficiently likely to be unlawful that they
should not be employed.
This is not as far-fetched an idea as it might appear. (In fact, as
Daniel Bodansky has put it, standards naturally tend to evolve into
rules.) 246 For instance,

the

African

Union

mission

in

Somalia

-

(AMISOM) issued an indirect-fire policy that limited its use of
indirect fire in civilian-populated areas except in extremis.24 7 And the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2012 decided it
would no longer use air-dropped munitions against civilian
residenceS 248 (and adopted various other civilian-protective policies
before that). 249 Likewise, rules of engagement (ROE) may require .w
certain kinds of target identification 250 or limit the kinds of munitions
that can be used under specific circumstances (as was the case during
the first Gulf War, when precision-guided munitions were used
against targets in downtown Baghdad 25 1).

244.

252

The use of "no-strike

See Corn, supra note 109, at 454 (referencing the deficiencies in current

critiques of command decisions).

Jakob Kellenberger, International Humanitarian Law at the Beginning of
245.
Roundtable,
https://www.icrc.org/eng/
21st
Century,
San
Remo
the
2017)
(last
visited
Sept.
21,
resources/documents/statement/5e2c8v.htm
[https://perma.cclGJR8-8B25 (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
246.
See Daniel Bodansky, Rules v. Standards in InternationalEnvironmental
Law, 98 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 275, 278 (2004) (noting the evolution from standards
into rules in international law as information develops and consensus emerges).
Adebayo Kareem, The Legal Challenges Raised by Conducting Hostilities
247.
Against
Organized
Non-State
Armed
Groups,
San
Remo
Roundtable,
http://www.iihl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11 /Kareem.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/9GRY-BWW9] (archived Sept. 21, 2017); see generally Sahr
Muhammedally, Minimizing Civilian Harm in Populated Areas: Lessons from
Examining ISAF and AMISOM Policies, 98(1) INT'L REV. RED CROSS 225 (2006)
(detailing the measures to avoid and limit any attacks that may impact civilian areas).
248.
ISAF Statement on Air Dropped Munitions (June 12, 2012),
visited
Sept.
21,
2017)
(last
http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-802331
[https://perma.cc/Y8GA-LEHQ] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
249.
See Muhammedally, supra note 247, at 233-38 (noting the progression of
changes undertaken to increasingly track damage done to civilian areas and limit
future civilian casualties).
250.
Cf. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 88, at 38-39.
251.
FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 153
(1992).

252.
Id. at 55; see, e.g., Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting 11-13 (2013)
("Targets may have certain specific restrictions associated with them that should be
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lists," which go beyond objects that would clearly be unlawful to
attack, is also increasing. (And, indeed, the US collateral damage
estimation doctrine treats different civilian objects differently. 25 3
And the collateral damage methodology that some states use seeks to
make it quantitative, rather than qualitative. 254 Finally, scholars
have begun to make such arguments, albeit on a case-by-case level, 255
and the ICRC has prominently advanced such an argument,
predicated upon the likelihood of indiscriminate effects-with respect
to the use of explosive weapons in civilian-populated areas (although,
as discussed infra, there are flaws with respect to that particular
effort).256

There is also some potential historical grounding to taking such
an approach. In its advisory opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, the International Court of Justice had to decide whether
the potential use of nuclear weapons should be tested on a case-bycase basis for whether such use was indiscriminate or whether, based
on the likely effect on civilians, the use of nuclear weapons should be
deemed indiscriminate per se,257 even if hypothetical situations
existed where they could, from a black letter perspective, be used in a

clearly documented in the ETF (for example, do not strike during daytime, strike only
with a certain weapon).").
Cf. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction, No-Strike and the
253.
Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology, CJCSI 3160.01, Enclosure B (2009)
(dividing collateral objects into different categories, such as religious structures and
refugee camps in Category I and civilian civic centers and recreational facilities in
Category II).
254.
See SOLIS, supra note 10, at 533 ("[a]ttempting to quantify military
necessity and proportionality .... ).
255.
See e.g., The Principleof Discriminationin Twenty First Century Warfare,
in ESSAYS ON LAW AND WAR AT THE FAULT LINES at 131, 137 (Michael N. Schmitt ed.,

2012); Christopher J. Markham & Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Air Warfare and the
Law of Armed Conflict, 89 INT'L L. STUD. 669, 681 (2013) (arguing that it would be an
indiscriminate attack to use a "weapon . . . in an environment that causes it to be
highly inaccurate (e.g., at a very high altitude or in weather that disrupts guidance
system functionality)."); cf. NATO REPORT, supra note 91, ¶ 29 ("Further, a
determination that inadequate efforts have been made to distinguish between military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects should not necessarily focus exclusively on a
specific incident. If precautionary measures have worked adequately in a very high
percentage of cases then the fact that they have not worked in a small number of cases
does not necessarily mean they are inadequate.") (emphasis added); Laurent Gisel, The
Use of Explosive Weapons in Densely Populated Areas and the Prohibition of
IndiscriminateAttacks, in CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 33, at 100, 111
("At this juncture, an informed discussion seems necessary and should contribute to
States forming a more elaborate policy position as a response to the humanitarian
concerns."); ICRC Q&A, supra note 183, at 103 ("The interpretation of the prohibition
of indiscriminate attacks may become more demanding with the development of new
means and methods of warfare, notably with advances in precision weaponry.").
. 256.
See generally ICRC Q&A, supra note 183, at 100 ("[E]xplosive weapons
with a wide impact area should not be used in densely populated areas due to the
significant likelihood of indiscriminate effects.").
257.
See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 262 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Case].
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discriminating fashion. 258 The black letter answer to this question
was clearly that if circumstances existed where nuclear weapons
could be directed at a military objective and would not cause
disproportionate civilian harm, they could not be deemed per se
indiscriminate. As the United States argued at the time, the legality
of use of nuclear weapons depended on a range of facts "that can only
be guessed at" in advance.25 9 The court, however, by the deciding vote
of its president, sought to thread a different needle. It held only that
it could not "conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of
self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake." 260 In so doing, it appeared to be seeking to offer something of
a test to states-indicating limited circumstances in which the use of
nuclear weapons might be permissible, 261 presumably on the basis
that only in such circumstances would there be sufficient necessity to
allow for even the possibility of lawful targeting.
Likewise, during the negotiation of Additional Protocol I, a
number of states wanted a committee to decide the means and
methods of warfare that should be prohibited by Article 36.262 Other
states, however, wanted to leave such determinations to each
individual state party, and they ultimately prevailed. Nevertheless,.
the ICRC Commentary explains that the phrase "some or all
circumstances" in Article 36 was intended to encompass "foreseeable"
uses of a weapon. 263 Thus, the Protocol did anticipate a form of
probabilistic legal review, at least in terms of the ways in which a
weapon would be likely to be used. So, rather than only looking to
whether a weapon could be used legally with respect to its probable
use, why not also look to whether it would more likely than not be
used illegally under particular circumstances?
Finally, focusing on objective norms for what should be
considered indiscriminate attacks (or at least the policy-based-

258.
nuclear

Cf. id. at 261; id. at 320 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (discussing the use of
weapons

against a

nuclear-weapon-armed

submarine at sea when that

submarine was about to, or had, fired nuclear weapons).
259.
See Written Statement of the Government of the United States of
America, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Written
Proceedings 7 (June 20, 1995) (arguing against a per se prohibition of nuclear
weapons).
260.
Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 257, at 266.
261.
Others understood that aspect of the Court's decision as specifying
circumstances where even otherwise apparently unlawful (under IHL) uses of nuclear
weapons might nevertheless not necessarily be unlawful. Nuclear Weapons Case, supra
note 257, at 590 (Higgins, J., dissenting).
262.
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 34, T$ 1463-1465.
263.
Id. TT 1468-71. In 1992, a legal review by the US Department of the Air
Force of the legality of extended range anti-armour munition stated that, while legal as
such, this munition "should, however, only be used in concentrations of civilians if the
military necessity for such use is great, and the expected collateral civilian casualties
would not be excessive in relation to the expected military advantage."
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equivalent) would in fact remove some of the results-based scrutiny
that has been the subject of so much debate. An indiscriminate attack
is indiscriminate, regardless of whether there are many civilians
killed or none. 264
This is not an argument for progress on efforts to articulate
standards for the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects. 26 5
That effort suffers from a dangerous lack of precision and would
sweep in too much conduct to be likely to appeal to states engaged in
armed conflict (or who believe they might be in the future). Nor is the
argument that stand-off weapons should be disfavored because
remote technology necessarily "de-humanizes" warfare by allowing
the commander distance from those who might suffer due to his or
her decisions credible. (To the extent the argument is that advanced
militaries have set minimum altitudes for aircraft conducting attacks
that shield them from risk but make target identification difficult,
this would appear to be a precautions question.)
But why should it be impossible to agree that based on their
likely effects, it would be unacceptable-the equivalent of an
indiscriminate attack-to drop certain kinds of unguided munition 266
from above a certain altitude into a certain kind of civilian-populated
area? 267 (Indeed, the United States already has a reticulated set of
rules that compare likely blast patterns to target areas in assessing

264.
Alexandra Boivin, The Legal Regime Applicable to Targeting Military
Objectives in the Context of Contemporary Warfare, University Center for
34
(2006),
http://www.genevaHumanitarian
Law
International
academy.ch/does/publications/collection-research-projects/CTR-objectif-militaire.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/5MHY-76D2] (archived Oct. 12, 2017) ("It does not follow that a
breach of the principle of proportionality can be equated with an indiscriminate attack,
nor does it follow that an attack which respects the principle of proportionality is
necessary discriminate.").
265.
In a 2012 report, the UN Secretary-General recommended that parties to
conflict refrain from using explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, UN
Doc. S/2012/376, 1 75 (2012). This issue has since gained a fair amount of traction.
266.
I recognize that it may be too simple to posit that lower-altitude attacks
are likely to be more precise, given, for instance, that a longer time between weapon

deployment and effect may allow adjustment to precision-guided munitions.
267.
I am here suggesting an approach that would not have covered NATO's
actions in Kosovo, but rather something more akin to what the Syrian regime has done
with its barrel bombs. Markham & Schmitt, supra note 255, at 682 ("International
law's application and understanding of the rules prohibiting indiscriminate attacks will
evolve with advances in precision weaponry. For example, while bombs dropped from a
B- 17 during World War II had a circular error probable exceeding three thousand feet,
today such accuracy (or lack thereof) would be considered indiscriminate. In the future,
it is plausible that unguided air-delivered weapons as such may begin to be
characterized as violating the prohibition."). One interesting 1986 proposal is cited in
Maya Brehm, InternationalHumanitarianLaw and the Protectionof Civiliansfrom the
Effects
of
Explosive
Weapons,
at
23,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=2373680 (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/L2LXWFXS] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
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whether to strike. 268) Why should there not be some limits on beyondvisual-range engagements using unsophisticated weapons? Why can
it not be said that a siege of a populated area is simply inappropriate
under certain circumstances (regardless of whether foodstuffs are
targeted and regardless of whether the ostensible objective of the
siege is to force the surrender of belligerents co-located with
civilians)? And why can it not be said that states should not engage in
cyber-attack against certain kinds of internet infrastructure (without
the need, for a complex proportionality calculation of the effects on
civilian use)?
This Article therefore urges taking a more objective approach to
the analysis of whether an attack should be considered
indiscriminate-something akin to the concept of "objective
recklessness," assessed by category on an ex ante basis. More
precisely, this would entail two elements-(1) an entirely objective
assessment of whether an attack is reckless as to targeting, and (2)
the making of such an assessment as to categories of attack (i.e., in a
rule-like way), rather than post hoc as applied to a specific attack. So,
if based on the type of weapon and circumstances there is a high risk
that the attack could not be conducted in compliance with the,.
principle of distinction, the attack should be deemed indiscriminate
regardless of whether or not the attacker knew (subjectively) of those
risks, and this analysis should be applied to types of attack.
The first element of the approach offered here is somewhat
similar to the now-mostly-abandoned
doctrine of Caldwell
recklessness. In R v. Caldwell, the UK House of Lords stated that
recklessness, with respect to the Criminal Damage Act, meant a
person "does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that
property will be destroyed or damaged and .

.

. when he does the act

he either had not given any thought to the possibility of there being
any such risk or has recognised that there was some risk involved
and has nonetheless gone on to do it." 269 Caldwell recklessness is a
form of recklessness that does not turn on the actor's appreciation of
the risk-i.e., it does not require the same scrutiny of what the actor
knew or thought, because it permits an actor to be deemed reckless
who has given no thought to the possibility of there being such a
risk. 270
This goes beyond the "recklessness" that the ICTY has applied in
its criminal analysis. The ICTY has used recklessness in the sense of
dolus eventualis, which is "advertent" recklessness-i.e., it requires

268.
See CJCSI 3160.01, supra note 253, Enclosure D, Appendix B (showing the
detailed process for estimating collateral damage).
269.
[1982] A.C. 341 at 354 (emphasis added).
270.
Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) ("A person acts recklessly with respect
to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.")
(emphasis added).
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that an individual have subjective awareness of the risk. 27 1 To give a
ripped-from-the-headlines example, dolus eventualis was recently the
subject of discussion in the Oscar Pistorius case, where the appeals
court in South Africa made clear that:
[t]he rhetorical question "How could the accused reasonably have foreseen that
the shots he fired would kill the deceased or whoever was behind the door?"
wrongly applies an objective rather than a subjective approach to the question
of dolus. The issue was not what was reasonably foreseeable when the accused

fired at the toilet door but whether he actually foresaw that death might occur
when he did so.

272

This Article does not argue for the negotiation of a new IHL
instrument-for which there may be little appetite-and since this
Article does not propose a criminal law standard, it is not something
that could readily emerge in jurisprudence. Rather, perhaps the most
that could be hoped for would be that states would coalesce around an
approach such as the one this Article articulates-likely in a nonbinding way. For instance, in the context of the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), states have made political
commitments regarding the use of anti-vehicle mines. Perhaps a
similar set of political commitments might be made with regard to
how to understand the concept of an indiscriminate attack going
forward. But while this Article's recommendation remains a tentative
one, the current circumstances warrant considering articulating a set
of norms governing kinds of attacks. Otherwise, the gap between war
fighting and the public debate risks yawning further.
To be clear, this Article does not necessarily suggest that a
recklessness standard be used in determining whether an individual
has committed a war crime. Indeed, it takes no view on whether there
should be a new approach to the war crime of indiscriminate attacks.
For one thing, the criminal law status of the prohibition of
indiscriminate attack is still uncertain.2 7 3 Moreover, separate from its

271.
See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 34, T 3474 ("the attitude of an agent
who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the possibility of it
happening"); see also John J. Merriam, Affirmative Target Identification:
Operationalizingthe Principleof Distinction for U.S. Warfighters, 56 VA. J. INT'L L. 83,
106 (2016) (referring to a "nonchalant" state of mind). But cf. Brian Finucane, Partners
and Legal Pitfalls, 92 INT'L L. STUD. 407, 413 (2016) (suggesting an objective approach,
although perhaps only as to the assessment of the risk as opposed to the question of the
appreciation of the risk); Merriam, supra, at 115-16 (suggesting that recklessness as
applied by the ICTY is lower than dolus eventualis insofar as it doesn't have a
subjective element).
272.
Gauteng v. Pistorius, 2015 (96) SA 1 at 16-17, para. 28.
273.
During the negotiation of the Rome Statute, there appears to have been
little attention paid to the issue of indiscriminate attacks, whether because it is not
among the grave breaches of Additional Protocol I, cf. Additional Protocol I art. 85, or
for other reasons. With respect to international armed conflict, the war crimes of
attacks on civilians and disproportionate attacks are covered. See Rome Statute
Articles 8(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv). Both of these are grave breaches of Additional Protocol I. So
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lower profile under international criminal law, it may be appropriate
to require a greater mens rea showing in the context of individual
criminal liability. For instance, the grave breaches provision of
Additional Protocol I requires that unlawful targeting be done
"willfully." 2 74 Likewise, there may be additional ways in which
criminal recklessness might be evidenced with respect to individual
conduct, such as whether the attacking state has shown the ability
lawfully to target under similar circumstances in the past. But such
an analysis would be inapt for a general, ex ante rule.
The next subpart defends this Article's "objective recklessness"
approach against criticism. It then concludes and extrapolates from
the specific analysis of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks.
B. Addressing Counter-Arguments
There are a handful of countervailing considerations. Perhaps
the two most significant questions are: (1) "Would an objective
recklessness approach significantly hinder commanders from
and (2)
"Would this
addressing unforeseen circumstances?"
incentivize parties to contrive to render military objectives off limits
by making their placement meet certain criteria?"
In general, the criticism of rules is that they tend to be both'
under- and over-inclusive.2 75 With respect to potential underinclusion, this Article's proposal would not mean that other IHL
provisions would not also still apply. With respect to the possibility of
over-inclusion, Yoram Dinstein, who has challenged the notion that a
defined list of military objectives would be unhelpful, makes a
persuasive point in arguing that "[p]aradoxically, the United States
has lost . . . concrete targets today only because of the curious belief
that the availability of a binding list might restrict its freedom of

too are uses of weapons and methods of combat that are inherently indiscriminate, see
Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(xx), although these are not grave breaches of the Protocol.
But there is no apparent coverage of attacks that are simply untargeted, nor does it

appear that much thought was given to exactly what methods of combat should be
considered inherently indiscriminate (as opposed to what weapons should be deemed to
fall in that category). Marie-Claude Roberge, The New InternationalCriminal Court: A
PreliminaryAssessment, 325 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 671, 673 (1998) ("there are

no provisions on . . . the launching of indiscriminate attacks affecting the civilian
population or civilian objects"). Dormann, in his treatise on the elements of crime
under the Rome Statute, does not treat the inclusion of "methods" in his discussion of
Article 8(2)(b)(xx). Further, interestingly, during the run-up to the Rome Conference
there was even discussion of not including the prohibition on inherently indiscriminate
weapons. Cf. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (options 2 and 3 for article on war crinkes (B)(o)). All
this said, I do take the view it is a war crime.
274.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 85(3); cf. Finucane, supra note
271, at 412.
275.
Bodansky, supra note 246, at 278 & n.8 (discussing IHL and asserting
that "[b]ecause knowledge is limited, we cannot anticipate every eventuality. If we
specify a rule, it is likely to be over- or -under-inclusive; it is likely to be too strict or lax
in contexts that were beyond our ability to anticipate.").
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action tomorrow, should it wish to strike at unspecified theoretical
targets that are over the horizon of time." 276 Moreover, as early as the
Hague Peace Conference of 1899, the United States said of efforts to
limit balloon-dropped projectiles: "We are without experience in the
use of arms whose employment we proposed to prohibit forever." 277
But the result is one that should be more willingly tested-that is, a
time-limited approach. 278
The second argument is that such an approach would allow
defenders to avoid attacks. But this argument is something of a
canard. 2 79 It has also been surfaced, for instance, with respect to
defenders' decisions to co-locate military objectives next to significant
civilian objects, with the result that an attack may prove impossible.
Simply put, the history of involuntary human shields 28 0 makes clear
that defenders have long been able to seek to mitigate the risk of
attack by themselves violating their distinction obligations, and new
approaches speaking to the specific methods of attack seem unlikely
to significantly change this dynamic.
Finally, there are a handful of other potential arguments that
would need to be considered: If there is a move toward a more
objective test with respect to attacks that should be deemed
impermissible, would there be a risk that certain attacks would be
presumed to be lawful? So for instance, as Ian Henderson notes, the
structure of IHL is that means or methods of warfare that are not
prohibited can be understood to be permitted.28 1 But, one might ask,
would ruling out certain kinds of attacks under certain circumstances
give greater legitimacy to other attacks that may, in the view of some,
sit in a "grey area"? While such a risk exists, it exists to at least the
same extent today. Likewise, is there a risk that a more rule-bound
approach could be repurposed to require a certain approach to
targeting (e.g., the use of precision-guided munitions under particular

276.
Yoram Dinstein, The Thirteen Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International
Law, 166 MIL. L. REV., 93, 107 (2000). With respect to military objectives, I do
appreciate, however, the view of the experts at the 2005 Geneva Academy meeting who
opined "lists could lead to the undesirable impression that everything on the list must
be a military objective at all times, or conversely, that if an object was not on the list, it
must be protected." Geneva Expert Report, supra note 180, at 8; see also HENDERSON,

)

supra note 43, at 47-48.
277.
Parks, supra note 42, at 11.
278.
Id.
279.
See, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 43, at 214 ("I can find no legal support
for the argument that the [attacker's] obligations are reduced [by a defender's failure to
comply]."); Boivin, supra note 264, at 19-20 ("[S]uch a violation [by defenders] does not
change the attacking Party's obligation ....
54); cf. Marty Lederman, Troubling Proportionalityand Rule-of-Distinction Provisions
in
the
Law
of
War
Manual,
JUST
SECURITY
(June
27,
2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/31661/law-war-manual-distinction-proportionality
[https://perma.cc/Z2C6-UFX9] (archived Oct. 12, 2017).
280.
See also ROGERS, supra note 91, at 77-79.
281.
HENDERSON, supranote 43, at 39.
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circumstances)? Such a result could be problematic insofar as it
would fail to account for all the vagaries of combat (such as
technological failure or weather conditions that would make a less
sophisticated munition more likely to reach a target) 282 and would be

subject to criticism by developing states on the ground that they are
not able to pay for such weapons. As there already may be such a
trend, such an effect, if it materialized, might not be significant.
Finally, does such an approach do damage to the long-standing
principle that individuals must be judged based on the specific facts
and circumstances prevailing at the time? 283 The short response is

that it is not argued here that this standard should be applied in the
context of individual criminal liability.

V. CONCLUSION

There is a growing divergence between outside entities' scrutiny
of particular attacks and the black letter rules that states apply.
There is a real risk of the development of two, parallel tracks of IHL.
As William Fenrick has put it, such a "two-track approach [could].
result in distortions on each track. The military participants may.
develop a version that is too pro-military and does not benefit from
informed external criticism, while the external reviewers may develop
a version that is simply unrealistic." 284 While how to address it with
respect to the full gamut of international humanitarian law norms is
well beyond the scope of this Article, states would be well-advised to
consider this themselves. In particular, if the key goal is to avoid
what Laurie Blank has characterized as "a steady erosion towards a
retrospective analysis driven by media coverage of civilian
casualties," 285 a limited number of more objective, ex ante rules seems
a reasonable price to pay.

282.
Cf. John F. Murphy, Some Legal (and a Few Ethical) Dimensions of the
Collateral Damage Resulting from NATO's Kosovo Campaign, 78 INT'L L. STUD. 229,
240 (2002).
283.
Compare, for instance, the UK statement upon ratification of Additional
Protocol I, that "[m]ilitary commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding
upon, or executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their
assessment of the information from all sources which is reasonably available to them at

the relevant time." Declaration c of the Declarations and Reservations made by the
UK.
284.
Fenrick, supra note 15, at 114.
285.
Blank, supra note 99, at 711.

